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Abstract 
The current debate concerning genetically modified (GM) crops is primarily focused on 
the negative consequences that the production and consumption of GM foods could have 
on people and the environment. Adding to the list of concerns is the multinational 
agrochemical corporations' plan to implement GURTs (Genetic Use Restriction 
Technologies) to prohibit the unauthorized use of certain genetically modified plant 
varieties. Several activist groups perceive the potential implementation of GURTs to be a 
threat to resource-poor farmers since this technology (which the activists call Terminator 
Technology) may be used to wrongfully exploit resource-poor farmers in the name of 
economic gain. In this thesis, I argue that multinational agrochemical corporations will 
not necessarily be infringing upon the rights of resource-poor farmers nor with they be 
wrongfully exploiting such farmers through the implementation of GURTs. Given that 
the primary targets for implementing GURTs are currently modified plant varieties, and 
most resource-poor farmers are unable to afford GM seeds, multinational agrochemical 
corporations will not have the opportunity to form a relation with these farmers and 
therefore would not be able to use them as a mere means to maximizing seed industry 
profits. I conclude that the implementation of GURTs may be construed as immoral on 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
For centuries, humans have domesticated certain plant varieties for their 
preferable nutritional and palatable characteristics. In order to grow crops that can 
produce such desirable characteristics farmers have selected certain plants as prototypical 
varieties, which they then bred with similar varieties to perfect a particular desirable trait; 
this gave rise to the art of plant breeding. Thanks to Oregor Mendel's experiments with 
pea plants, plant breeders were able to apply their new understanding of plant genetics to 
traditional methods of crop production. During the past few decades, scientists have 
made great strides in understanding and manipulating the genomes of various plant 
varieties. Such advances in the field of genetics have allowed plant breeders to take 
portions of one plant genome and splice them into the genome of another plant. This 
technology has come to be known as genetic modification (OM). The commercial 
application of OM technology in the agricultural industry has been plagued with negative 
publicity due to the artificial means by which plant genomes are altered. 
Currently, OM crops are touted as being both a blessing and a curse. On the one 
side, OM crops are a blessing because they may be used to produce more food in barren 
lands thereby making food available where it is needed the most. For instance, some OM 
crops are being designed to grow in severe conditions, making certain plant varieties 
drought resistant, which permit particular crops to be grown in more arid regions. 
Another potential benefit of using OM crops is that specific plant varieties such as Bt 
Com and Roundup Ready® Soybeans have been engineered, so their manufacturers 
claim, to require little to no chemical applications since the plant either produces its own 
pesticides (in the case of Bt Com) or is resistant to herbicides (in the case of Roundup 
Ready® Soybeans).1 On the other side, OM crops have been thought to be a curse since 
genetically modified organisms (OMOs) have the potential to wreak havoc on the health 
of the natural environment and the human consumers of OM products. With regard to the 
potential negative impacts on the natural environment, some argue that OM plants may 
mate with wild relatives to create super weeds that become uncontrollable; may lead to 
the extinction of certain species; or may cause a decrease in biodiversity. Such scenarios 
could result from OM pollen drifting to neighboring crops or into the natural landscape 
(in both instances) potentially fertilize plant varieties that are closely related to the OM 
variety. 
1 Claim such as these have been made by agrochemical corporations and have been contested by many 
activist groups opposing GMOs. Bt plant varieties appear to obviously require little to no chemical 
application since the plant produces its own pesticides. On the other hand, Roundup Ready® plant varieties 
do not seem to necessarily require less herbicide application. Some GMO opponents contend that the latter 
plant varieties may require less discriminant application of herbicides since the crops are resistant, resulting 
in a potential increase in the amount of chemical applied to a particular crop. Such an increase in herbicide 
application may negatively impact the health of the local environment. Even though it is true that Roundup 
Ready® plant varieties would require less discriminant application of herbicides, it does not necessarily 
mean that more herbicide will be applied to the crop. It would just not be profitable for a particular farmer 
to both purchase Roundup Ready® varieties (which will probably be more expensive than traditional plant 
varieties) and increase herbicide application. So, merely from an economic perspective, Roundup Ready® 
plant varieties will not necessarily result in an increase in herbicide application. 
1 
In order to guard against or to minimize such genetic pollution the scientific 
community has been involved in the research and development of biological confinement 
methods for controlling the dispersal of transgenes.z One such biological confinement 
method known as the seed sterility method has gained a nefarious reputation over the past 
six years. This bioconfinement method allows seeds to grow into productive plants, but 
the seeds produced are sterile. Seed sterility has also been developed for use in 
commercial seed markets as a method for restricting the use of particular plant varieties. 
When used for such commercial applications, this technology is known as a form of 
genetic use restriction technology (GURTs). The reason that this technology has 
received much negative pUblicity is that some NGOs and activist groups believe that it 
has been developed as a means for exploiting resource-poor farmers in developing 
countries. 
Many NGOs and activist groups throughout the world (mainly in the US, Canada, 
and the UK) have been very outspoken concerning the "immorality" of GURTs and have 
demonized this technology by tagging it "Terminator Technology". They argue (as we 
shall soon see) that Terminator Technology is immoral because it threatens to infringe 
upon the rights of resource-poor farmers (mainly in developing countries) by denying 
them the ability to save the seeds of their harvests. The NGO literature opposing the 
commercial use of GURTs makes, however, little reference to scientific literature 
weighing the potential positive and negative environmental and socioeconomic 
consequences of this novel technology. I suspect the reason for this lack of scientific 
support is not that the NGOs have failed to do their research or that they have ignored 
some body of scientific literature. Instead, it is probably due to the fact that there is very 
little published on the science behind Terminator Technology other than what is found in 
the patent description. Given that little is known about the biological mechanism that 
governs Terminator Technology, it seems precipitous to conclude that the 
implementation of this technology will actually have negative environmental and 
socioeconomic consequences that many NGOs and activist groups adamantly believe to 
be inevitable. 
The intent of this thesis is to take an objective look at the claims made bl NGOs 
and activists regarding the potential implementation of Terminator Technology. Stated 
concisely, the NGOs' main objection to Terminator Technology is that it promises to 
grant multinational agrochemical corporations (MACs) a disproportionately large amount 
of power over resource-poor farmers and thereby allowing the MACs to infringe upon the 
rights of these farmers and to effectively exploit them in the pursuit of economic gain. 
Even though there are many other ways that the use of GURTs can be construed as 
wrong, I narrowly intend to argue that MACs using Terminator Technology will not 
necessarily be infringing upon the rights of resource-poor farmers, nor will they 
2 A trans gene is a gene taken from one organism and spliced into the genome of another through artificial 
means. 
3 I understand that almost every objective take on a particular issue has at its foundation some bias that 
negates a truly objective view. My modest attempt at taking an objective look at the Terminator 






necessarily be wrongfully exploiting resource-poor fanners by expecting a return on their 
investments. 
Aside from the limited range of concerns that I will address in this thesis, there 
are other serious concerns related to the potential implementation of Terminator 
Technology such as the broader social justice issues which include (but not limited to): 
the further oppression of resource-poor fanners through the imposition of barriers in the 
agricultural markets that effectively restrict their ability to direct their own lives; and 
greater economic inequalities arising from advances in agrotechnology that have the 
potential to become so great that poor fanners are left to fight an uphill battle for 
survival. Such dismal consequences may even help increase the existing gap between 
first-world and third-world countries. I raise these other concerns here to call attention to 
the broad scope of the issue of implementing Terminator Technology in commercial 
agricultural markets. Furthermore, there may be a variety of other ways that resource­
poor fanners may be hanned by the implementation of this and other novel 
agrotechnologies. Even though these are all very important concerns, I will limit my 
discussion to the seemingly explicit objections made by NOOs and activist groups against 
the potential implementation of Terminator Technology. 
It is not my aim to suggest that the limited scope of this thesis adequately 
addresses all of the issues concerning the possible implementation of Terminator 
Technology. To be explicit, I do not contend that there are no grounds upon which the 
commercial use of Terminator Technology can be morally condemned; all I intend to 
argue is that the implementation of Terminator Technology will not necessarily infringe 
upon the rights of resource-poor fanners nor will it necessarily wrongfully exploit them. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters: Chapter 2: The Case 
against Terminator Technology, Chapter 3: Human Righ~s, Chapter 4: Exploitation, and 
Chapter 5: Conclusion. In Chapter 2, I will recapitulate the main argument opposing 
Terminator Technology in an attempt to understand what, exactly, the opposition finds 
wrong with this technology. In Chapter 3: I will exposit Henry Shue's basic rights theory 
and explain how this theory can be used to understand the rights claims made by NOOs 
as a condemnation of Terminator Technology. I will argue that the implementation of 
Terminator Technology in commercial seed markets will not necessarily infringe upon 
the rights of resource-poor farmers. In Chapter 4, I will provide an exegesis of Judith 
Tormey's conception of exploitation, including critical revisions intended to fortify her 
view. After offering a coherent account of exploitation, I will analyze the Terminator 
Technology debate through the lens of my revised conception of exploitation. Here I 
argue that Terminator Technology will not necessarily present itself as a means for 
MACs to wrongfully exploit resource-poor fanners as long as these fanners are not 
duped into using terminator seeds through deceptive marketing schemes. In Chapter 5, I 
will argue that even though the potential implementation of Terminator Technology in 
the global agricultural market will neither inevitably infringe upon the rights of resource­
poor fanners nor will it necessarily be used as a means to wrongfully exploiting resource­
poor farmers, MACs still have a moral obligation to minimize the potential negative 
effects that implementing this technology may impose on resource-poor fanners and the 
global community; and with this in mind, MACs should proceed with caution. 
3 
Chapter 2: The Case against Terminator Technology 
On March 3rd, 1998, the US patent entitled "Control of Plant Gene Expression" 
was jointly issued to Delta & Pine Land Company (D & PL) and the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA).4 The actual technology protected by this patent is known within the 
scientific community as GURTs which is a term used refer to a complex of genes that are 
spliced into transgenic plants intended to control the full reproduction of certain varieties 
or the expression of particular phenotypes. There are two main categories of GURTs: T­
GURTs, which restrict the expression of a certain trait (phenotype) by switching on or off 
a specific group of genes responsible for particular phenotypic expressions; and V­
GURTs, which restrict the use of the entire plant variety by switching on a gene that 
terminates further reproduction of the plant. The expression of terminator genes is 
controlled by an external stimulus involving the application of a particular chemical 
(typically tetracycline) to the seeds containing these genes.6 
The Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC group), 
formerly RAFI (Rural Advancement Foundation International), has been leading the 
crusade against GURTs (specifically V-GURTs) since the late 1990's.7 When it began its 
campaign against GURTs, the ETC group (then RAFI) coined the term "Terminator 
Technology" referring to GURTs. The name "Terminator Technology" appears 
appropriate since this technology is used to alter the plant genome so as to produce sterile 
seeds. The ETC group is not the only activist group protesting the agricultural 
implementation of this technology, but they are the forerunners of the opposition. 
4 P.K. Gupta, "The Terminator Technology for Seed Production and Protection: Why and How?" Current 

Science 75 (1998): 1319-1323; Bert Visser, et aI., "The Impact of 'Terminator' Technology," 

Biotechnology and Development Monitor 48 (2001): 9-12. There are actually three patents under the name 

"Control of Plan Gene Expression": patent numbers 5,723,765 (March 3, 1998),5,925,808 (July 20, 1999), 

5,977,441 (November 2, 1999). 

5 Bert Visser, et aI., "The Impact of 'Terminator' Technology," Biotechnology and Development Monitor 

48 (2001): 9-12; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Potential Impacts of Genetic 

Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) on Agricultural Biodiversity and Agricultural Production Systems, 

(Rome: 2001), 2; Derek Eaton, et al., "Economic and Policy Aspects of 'Terminator' Technology," 

Biotechnology and Development Monitor 49 (2002): 19-22. 

6 United States Patent: 5,723,765, Oliver, et al. (March 3, 1998); P.K. Gupta, "The Terminator Technology 

for Seed Production and Protection: Why and How?" Current Science 75 (1998): 1319-1323; Bert Visser, 

et aI., "The Impact of 'Terminator' Technology," Biotechnology and Development Monitor 48 (2001): 9­
12. 
7 RAFI's work is widely cited by the several activist groups such as Food First 
(http://www.foodfirst.orgiprogslgloballge/sactoministeriallterminatorD.Primal Seeds 
(http://www.primalseeds.orglterminator.htm). Union of Concerned Scientists 
(http://www.ucsusa.orglpublicationsl gene exchange.cfm?publicationID=267), The Rockefeller Foundation 
(http://www.rockfound.orgIDocuments/182/proprights.pdD, Greenpeace 
(http://archive.greenpeace.orglgenenglhighlightslpatl980920.htm), and Genetic Resource Action 
International (http://www.grain.orglpublications/rice-en.cfm). RAFI has also been cited in several 
publications such as articles in Time Magazine 
(http://www .0rganicconsumers.org!Monsanto/timeterm.cfm) and The Ecologist 
(http://www.theecologist.orglarchive article.html?article=355); in Vandana Shiva's book, Biopiracy; and 
in Jack Wilson's article, "Intellectual Property Rights in Genetically Modified Agriculture," which can be 




Because the ETC group is at the forefront of the crusade against Terminator Technology, 
I will first focus on explaining their reasons for opposing the use of GURTs in 
agricultural markets. 
According to the ETC group, Terminator Technology is "an immoral technology 
that threatens global food security, especially for the 1.4 billion people who depend on 
farm-saved seed."g Terminator Technology is "immoral" because it infringes upon a 
farmer's right to save the seed of her harvest for planting the next season's crop.9 If 
terminator seeds are commercialized, farmers will be forced to "return to the seed 
corporations every year and will make extinct the 12,OOO-year tradition of farmers saving, 
adapting and exchanging seed in order to advance biodiversity and increase food 
security."IO Also, these "suicide seeds" differ from hybrid seeds in that the latter do not 
produce sterile seeds, which allows the farmer to improve the agronomic performance of 
the hybrid seeds by cross-breeding them with indigenous varieties that are well adapted 
to specific bioregions. In order to put an end to farmers violating seed patents, MACs 
(such as Monsanto) have genetically altered some plant varieties so that the harvested 
seeds are sterile. The creation of Terminator Technology, according to the ETC group, is 
an attempt by MACs "to maximize seed industry profits by destroying the right of 
farmers to save their seeds and breed their own crops," which not only infringes upon a 
farmer's right to save seeds but also exploits farmers. 1 1 
Also, implementing Terminator Technology will inevitably result in 
"bioserfdom," which will effectively hold farmers "hostage" to MACs by illegitimately 
capitalizing on the farmers' vulnerabilities. I2 If resource-poor farmers lose control of 
their seeds, they will also lose control of their farming s1'stems, rendering them 
dependent upon MACs for seeds and other agricultural inputs. 1 According to the ETC 
group, "[Terminator Technology's] sole purpose is to force farmers to return to the 
commercial seed market every year.,,14 What's more, if farmers become a sort of 
indentured servants to these MACs, national food security will be threatened, which may 
lead to poorer nations depending upon richer nations for food. So, the ETC group 
appears to believe that the commercial implementation of Terminator Technology does 
not bode well for farmers in poor nations, since such an "insidious technology" will 
possibly require the help of rich nations in the form of food aid that many times is not 
given without significant political strings attached. I5 
Siding with the ETC group, Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, "who was instrumental in 
making the Green Revolution a success in India describes the [terminator] technology as 
8 ETC group (The Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration), "Sterile Harvest: New Crop 

of Terminator Patents Threatens Food Sovereignty," News Release 31 January 2002, 





10 ETC group, "Terminate Terminator in 2002: Defend Food Sovereignty," 19 February 2002, 









14 ETC group, "RAFI Annual Report: September 1997 August 1998," 

http://www.etcgroup.orgldocumentslreport98.PDF (31 March 2004). 

15 This paragraph is a paraphrasing of the ETC group's position against Terminator Technology as it 

appears in the publication "Terminate Terminator." 

5 
'unethical' and fears that it has the potential to 'endanger the country's food security.",16 
Dr. Swaminathan agrees that fanners need to be able to save the seeds of their harvest in 
order to ensure India's food security, and adds that this technology may imperil India's 
food security through unwitting fanners planting these "suicide seeds."17 If fanners 
unknowingly sow "suicide seeds," crops will not grow, and they will be left without both 
a product to sell and seeds to plant during the next season. If such a scenario obtains, 
agricultural production will fall precipitously in successive years resulting in both a more 
endangered food supply for India and fanners falling further in debt. I8 In addition to the 
concerns over India's food security, Dr. Swaminathan fears that the chemicals used to 
render the seeds sterile (tetracycline or other chemicals) will make the seeds unsafe to 
consume, adding insult to injury. 19 
Furthermore, Dr. Swaminathan believes that 
... there is a need for a universal declaration on Plant Genome and 
Fanners' Rights similar to the universal declaration on Human Genome 
and Human Rights adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ... The UNESCO declaration 
stipulates in Article 10 that 'no research applications concerning the 
human genome, in particular in the fields of biology, genetics and 
medicine, should prevail over respect for the human rights, fundamental 
freedom and human dignity of individuals. ,20 
It seems that the connection being drawn between the rights provided by the declaration 
on Human Genome and Human Rights and the need for a similar declaration on Plant 
Genome and Fanners' Rights is that both ensure (or would ensure) certain basic human 
rights. So, according to Dr. Swaminathan, fanners should have a right to the seeds of 
their harvest since such a right would further guarantee the basic right to food for people 
in poorer nations.21 
Adding to this dismal outlook on GURTs, Christian Aid says in its report, 
"Selling Suicide," that "Even for better-off farmers in poor countries the terminator 
stands to raise costs and lock fanners into tightly controlled marketing and licensing 
agreements.,,22 This group concedes that fanners are not actually forced to begin using 
the seeds and other agricultural inputs sold by MACs. However, Christian Aid contends 
that the marketing techniques used by these companies are what get the farmers hooked. 




18 The alarming suicide rate among farmers in India is due to their inability to provide for their families. If 

the farmer kills himself, the government provides assistance to his remaining dependents. Christian Aid, 

"Selling Suicide: Farming, False Promises and Genetic Engineering in Developed Countries," May 1999, 

http://www.christian-aid.org.uklindepthl9905suic/suicide2.htm (25 February 2004). 





21 M.S. Swaminathan, "Farmers' Rights and Plant Genetic Resources," Biotechnology and Development 

Monitor 36 (1998): 6-9. 

22 Christian Aid, "Selling Suicide: Farming, False Promises and Genetic Engineering in Developed 







These aggressive marketing schemes are apparently an attempt to exploit uneducated 
farmers who are incapable of accurately discerning between unsubstantiated claims and 
scientific facts regarding the products being sold. Apparently, farmers also have to wade 
through enticement such as free seed trials, misleading promotions, and credits?3 
Moreover, if "suicide seeds" are aggressively marketed, "the worst scenario would be 
that within just a few years, poor farmers will no longer have their own, improved seeds 
to return to.,,24 Prohibited from saving their seeds by MACs' implementation of GURTs, 
resource-poor farmers will be unable to breed new, stronger, more locally adapted 
varieties. This will give more control to the agrochemical companies while weakening 
the bargaining power of these farmers. 
More importantly, some peasant farmers believe that patents on seeds will 
illegitimately infringe upon their basic rights by drastically limiting their freedom. 
According to Leopold Guilaran, a Visayas farmer, " ...patents on seeds illustrate the 
extent to which transnationals want to establish monopolies on life, maximize profit, and 
dominate the world.,,25 Ka Memong Patayan, a Filipino peasant farmer who experienced 
colonial serfdom claims that "A patent on seeds is a patent on freedom .. .If you have to 
pay for patented seeds, it's like being forced to buy your own freedom. ,,26 
So, it seems the major moral objection to the potential implementation of 
Terminator Technology is that it will both infringe upon the basic rights of farmers and 
will allow MACs to use resource-poor farmers as a mere means to maximizing seed 
industry profits. If this is actually the case, corporations implementing Terminator 
Technology (such as Monsanto) will be wrongfully exploiting farmers, especially in poor 
nations. While wrongfully exploiting farmers through the use of Terminator Technology, 
MACs reap the benefits of resource-poor farmers becoming increasingly dependent upon 
their products, resulting in the farmers losing their ability to determine their own lives ­
essentially transforming these farmers into indentured servants by obligating them to 
meet the demands of their new masters (seed suppliers)?? Also, if improperly controlled, 
"suicide seeds" will render the crops of unwitting farmers sterile, effectively reducing the 
agricultural products of those nations. If the food security of a developing nation is 
imperiled, it may lose its ability for self-determination making it more dependent upon 
wealthier nations for subsistence. As a result of all the alleged problems inextricably 
linked to the implementation of Terminator Technology, many activist groups consider 
its potential implementation to be immoral. 
Generally speaking, the activist groups' case against Terminator Technology 
seems to elicit an emotional response and may cause us to prejudicially condemn MACs 
for using this technology from a common sense moral position. In the wake of the recent 




25 GRAIN (Genetic Resource Action International), "Biopiracy, Trips and the Patenting Of Asia's Rice 

Bowl: A Collective NGO Situationer on IPRs on Rice," May 1998, http://www.grain.orglpublications/rice­

en.cfm#1 (16 February 2004). 

26 Katharine Ainger. "Is George Bush the new Bob Geldof?" New Statesman 16, no.763 (2003): 22. 

27 This term seems appropriate since many of the farmers who "choose" to abandon antiquated methods of 

agriculture for the sophisticated products provided by MACs become "hooked" by the morally questionable 






which exploit workers in developing countries, we tend to think that this sort of corporate 
conduct is nothing new, albeit wrong. 28 Based on the claims made in this chapter, it 
seems that critics of this technology find it "immoral" because it will infringe upon the 
basic rights of resource-poor farmers and wrongfully exploit them in the name of 
economic gain. Before fully accepting the activists' case against Terminator Technology, 
we need to examine the veracity of their arguments opposing this technology. As a 
result, I will demonstrate that even though the activists appear to be adamantly convinced 
that the potential implementation of Terminator Technology is morally reprehensible, 
they effectively fail to offer sufficient empirical proof to justify their claims. 
28 Rachael Naba, ''The Gap, Nike, Benneton and Wal-Mart: Corporate Slavemasters," 
http://theearthcenter.comlffarchi vessweatshops l.html (01 March 2004). 
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Chapter 3: Human Rights 
In this Chapter, I will first discuss Henry Shue's conception of basic human 
rights, which seems appropriate for the current project, and then apply this conception to 
the potential implementation of Terminator Technology. As a prefatory note, I do not 
consider Henry Shue to be the authority on basic human rights. Shue's account of basic 
human rights appears to pose fewer problems than other rights theorists when applying 
these rights to the current project. Other human rights commentators such as Thomas 
Pogge and Jack Donnelly clearly have a political agenda to fulfill. Thomas Pogge 
develops an account of human rights that, as he claims, is " ... a specific institutional 
understanding of what human rights are. It does not direct! y address the question of what 
human rights are.,,29 Jack Donnelly understands human rights to be "a sort of self­
fulfilling prophecy: 'Treat people like human beings ... and you'll get truly human 
beings.' The forward-looking moral vision of human nature that is the source of human 
rights provides the basis for the social changes implicit in claims of human rights.,,3o 
Both seem to understand human rights as a tool for making social changes. That is, 
human rights grant the right-holder the power to make legitimate demands on individuals 
and society that will result in improved social changes. Since I am not particularly 
interested advocating for any sort of social change in this project, I will avoid appealing 
to Pogge's and Donnelly's accounts of human rights. Instead, I will appeal to Henry 
Shue's account mainly because he attempts to discover which rights are essential to the 
enjoyment of any other rights. Such an account will be helpful in determining if the 
implementation of Terminator Technology is infringing upon farmers' most basic rights. 
Additionally, Shue's account is easily supported by a Kantian justification, which 
establishes a necessity for certain basic rights for humans to become and remain moral 
agents. 
Some of the questions that will be addressed in this chapter are as follows. What 
basic rights do farmers legitimately have? Does the implementation of terminator 
technology in developing countries illegitimately infringe upon the basic rights of poor 
farmers? The main claim that I will defend in this chapter will be that Terminator 
Technology, if implemented in a legitimate manner, will not infringe upon a farmer's 
basic rights. 
Section 3.1: Basic Human Rights 
In our increasingly globalized world, it is often difficult to understand how we 
ought to treat other people in foreign nations. The difficulty here arises primarily from 
the fact that diverse cultures have different norms, which give rise to a wide variety of 
29 Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms 

(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2(02), 69. 






acceptable treatments for human beings. In an attempt to establish a foundation for a set 
of universal human rights that transcend national and cultural boundaries, the United 
Nations developed The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) after World 
War II. The rights detailed in the UDHR seem to be more than a set of basic rights that 
should apply to humans universally given that some of these rights go beyond a minimal 
standard for moral conduct.31 My intent here is not to develop a robust theory of human 
rights, but merely to determine a moral minimum below which no moral agent should be 
permitted to go. That is, I intend to establish a moral foundation for the basic rights of 
humans which will be useful in detecting situations where persons, throughout the world, 
illegitimately have their most basic rights infringed upon. 
Many philosophers who develop conceptions of human rights tend to grant these 
rights to all humans merely on the grounds that they belong to the species Homo sapiens. 
Granting such rights to all humans simply because they are human is problematic since 
not all humans are capable of directly enjoying the objects of all "human rights." Some 
humans, especially those who are mentally incapacitated, are not able to enjoy many of 
the rights detailed in the UDHR. However, defending a set of basic rights that would 
apply to both human beings and non-human beings is beyond the scope of this project.32 
My focus here will be to identify the basic rights needed by those members of our species 
who are sufficiently functional to fully realize the capacities that are uniquely human. 
That is, I intend to offer a set of basic human rights required by humans to develop 
realize the capacity unique to humans -- namely to develop into moral agents. In order to 
attain this goal, I will appeal to Henry Shue' s account of basic rights and a Kantian 
justification for such rights. Admittedly, Kantian theories are often criticized for 
narrowness of scope, resulting in either marginalizing or completely disregarding the 
interests of moral patients (both human and non-human). However, it is reasonably 
sufficient to deal only with moral agents in this project since the case against Terminator 
Technology deals with the basic rights of farmers who are moral agents. 
In his book, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, Henry 
Shue claims that moral rights essentially provide a rational basis for a justified demand 
on others for certain things or treatments, and that the actual enjoyment of a particular 
moral right is socially guaranteed (or protected) against threats. 33 Furthermore, a right is 
a demand on others to either avoid interfering with the right-holder's enjoyment of a 
particular right or a demand on others to provide something to the right-holder that is 
essential to the enjoyment of a particular right. In this latter case, Shue maintains that for 
a right to be fulfilled, arrangements (either legal or social) must be in place ensuring that 
particular rights are capable of being enjoyed.34 Such arrangements offer a minimum 
guarantee against threats to particular rights.35 Shue claims: 
31 Article 24 of the UDHR states: "Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable 
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay." Having a right to "periodic holidays with 
r:ay" seems to go beyond a minimal standard of how people ought to be treated. 
2 Severely mentally incapacitated humans and some higher non-human animals may deserve some rights 
even if they are not found to be deserving of "human rights." 
33 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 13. 








... one of the chief purposes of morality in general, and certainly of 
conceptions of rights, and of basic rights above all, is indeed to provide 
some minimal protection against utter helplessness to those too weak to 
protect themselves. Basic rights are a shield for the defenseless against at 
least threats, which include ... loss of security and loss of subsistence. 
Basic rights are a restraint upon economic and political forces that would 
otherwise be too strong to be resisted. They are social guarantees against 
actual and threatened deprivations of at least some basic needs. Basic 
rights are an attempt to give to the powerless a veto over some of the 
forces that would otherwise harm them the most. 36 
So, according to Shue, basic rights serve as a moral minimum for what we owe to others 
and for what we can reasonably expect from others.37 
Basic rights are considered basic since the enjoyment of all other rights depends 
on the enjoyment of basic rights.38 This is why basic rights are inalienable or 
nontransferable: to sacrifice basic rights for a non-basic right (such as sacrificing the right 
to security for a right to leisure) is self-defeating since the enjoyment of the basic right is 
necessary for the enjoyment of non-basic rights.39 This point is more than a mere 
practical assertion or an empirical fact, it is also logically necessary. First, persons are 
purposeful beings that, by their very nature, set goals and go about fulfilling them on a 
regular basis. Further, it is empirically true that persons require the basic rights of 
freedom and well-being in order to pursue their individual aims. Yet it does not follow 
that one has a right to anything and everything that one requires to fulfill one's individual 
aims. That is, just because A requires X to fulfill goal Y does not necessarily mean that 
A has a right to X. Consequently, we must appeal to something more fundamental than 
mere individual aims to set a firm foundation for the basic moral rights of persons. One 
such justification is Kant's metaphysical moral criterion of universalizability, which 
requires that a proposition be logically consistent for it to be universalizable. In the case 
of making false promises, Kant claims that it is logically inconsistent to hold that it 
should become a universal law that everyone ought to make a false promise when it suits 
them since doing so would negate the proposition that it is possible to make a false 
promise. Put differently, making a false promise requires that others typically make 
honest promises in order for a false promise to masquerade as an honest promise. If it 
were a universal law that everyone should make a false promise when it suits them, then 
false promises would be the norm and to make a false promise would cease to be fruitful 
since no one would trust promises. As a result, making a false promise cannot be 
universalized, since doing so is logically inconsistent (or self-defeating). Similarly, 
Kantians assume that it is logically inconsistent to claim that one is an autonomous being 
who requires security and subsistence to realize (or enact) one's autonomous nature, 
36 Ibid., 18. 
37 Ibid., 18-19. 





while holding that autonomous beings do not have a legitimate right to freedom and well­
being.4o 
Shue believes the right to security and the right to subsistence to be the two most 
basic moral rights one can have.41 He understands the right to security as being a 
guarantee that one will not be threatened with murder, rape, beating, or any other 
physical harm when attempting to enjoy a particular right.42 Shue suggests that "such 
threats to physical security are among the most serious and - in much of the world the 
most widespread hindrances to the enjoyment of any right.,,43 If people are not granted a 
basic moral right to physical security, then they cannot make legitimate demands on 
others to allow them to enjoy a particular right, without fear of physical harm, which may 
tend to diminish their ability to enjoy the right.44 
By a "right to subsistence," Shue means that people have a right to at least 
subsistence and possibly nothing more extending beyond mere subsistence.45 The right 
to subsistence establishes a moral minimum to allow those who can to provide for 
themselves (or to provide to those who cannot), and because of this right, people can 
reasonably expect "some level of social organization to protect the minimal cleanliness of 
air and water and to oversee the adequate production, or import, and the proper 
distribution of minimal food, clothing, shelter, and elementary health care.,,46 
Accordingly, it is the responsibility of society to fulfill and secure subsistence rights since 
the problems that stem from a deficiency in subsistence are "serious and general" in that 
failure to correct such a deficiency "would hinder the enjoyment of all other rights.,,47 
Furthermore, guaranteeing subsistence is an "inherent necessity" since having unimpeded 
access to the basic necessities of life (such as those detailed in the right to subsistence) is 
not separate from the enjoyment of any other rights. Instead, having adequate food, 
water, shelter, etc. are essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.48 So to have a right 
to subsistence means that one has a right to "unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate 
food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal preventative public healthcare.,,49 
Shue also draws a distinction between "having" a right and "enjoying" a right. It 
does not make much practical sense for one merely to have a right when the enjoyment of 
40 The above argument is a variation of Arnold's appeal to Alan Gewirth's justification for granting persons 

the rights to freedom and well-being. Denis G. Arnold, "Moral Reasoning, Human Rights, and Global 

Labor Practices," in Rising Above Sweatshops: Innovative Management Approaches to Global Labor 
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41 In Basic Rights: Subsistence, AjJluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, Shue actually claims that there are 

three basic rights: a right to security, a right to subsistence, and a right to liberty. 

42 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, AjJluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1980),21. 

43 Ibid., 19. 

44 Benefiting from infringing on a persons right to security would be considered a case of wrongful 
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the right is not guaranteed. In such a case, there would be no practical difference 
between having a right and not having a right since the right-holder would not have an 
enforceable claim on others to allow her to actually enjoy the right. Shue maintains that 
humans deserve basic moral rights to security and subsistence because these two rights 
grant humans the power to morally demand that others either allow access to or provide 
the basic necessities required for human flourishing, regardless of how we define "human 
flourishing." Likewise, for someone or something to be an appropriate recipient of a 
right, that person or thing must be capable of enjoying the object of a particular right.5o It 
seems reasonable to maintain that one must first have the capacity to directly enjoy the 
object of a particular right (of any kind) before we can say that one should have such a 
right. For example, it makes little sense (if any) to claim that a man should have a right 
to an abortion for he is unable to directly enjoy the object of this right. Granted, a man 
can enjoy the effects of a woman having an abortion to a certain extent since, through an 
abortion, he can relieve himself of any and all parental duties. However, he is not 
directly affected by the pregnancy as is the mother. Since the mother is directly affected 
by the pregnancy, insofar as the rregnancy involves her own body, it makes sense to 
grant her the right to an abortion.5 So, we can make two distinctions here: 1) one must 
be capable of enjoying the object of a particular right for one to actually have the right, 
and 2) if one is said to have a particular right one should at least be allowed to enjoy the 
object of the right. 
The need for appealing to a conception of basic rights is to establish a moral 
minimum that may help to reduce the vulnerability people have to being deprived of the 
basic things that they need to develop into autonomous moral agents and to maintain such 
a status. Both positive and negative rights require different sorts of obligation owed, by 
the duty-holder, to the rights-holder. Expressly, the conception of rights that I am 
espousing here will necessarily correspond with duties. The specific duties that correlate 
with certain rights will depend upon both the sort of right in question and the relation 
between the right-holder and the duty-bearer. That is, a right-holder can legitimately 
expect a certain response from the duty-bearer based on the relationship that exists 
between them. 
As for the specific duties owed to a rights-holder, Shue claims that there are three 
general duties that correlate with each basic right: 1) A duty to avoid depriving a person 
of the object of a right; 2) A duty to protect from depriving a person of the object of a 
right; and 3) A duty to aid a person that is deprived of the object of a basic right.52 
Regarding the right to subsistence, which is most applicable to this project, others have 
the following correlative duties: 
50 An object of a right is merely the thing that the right guarantees the enjoyment of. That is, the object of a 
right to freedom is the actual enjoyment of freedom. One can be said to have a right to freedom without 
being granted the enjoyment of freedom. In such a situation, we would normally say that this person's 
right to freedom is being infringed upon since the person is denied the object of the right to freedom. 
51 I am not defending or categorizing the right to an abortion here. My only intent is to demonstrate that 
such a right (if granted) can only be directly enjoyed by a woman, and that being able to directly enjoy the 
object of the right is a necessary (but not a sufficient) reason for granting persons a right of any kind. 
52 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (princeton, NJ: Princeton 






I. 	 To avoid eliminating a person's only available means of subsistence. 
II. 	 To protect persons against deprivation of the only available means of 
subsistence by other persons 
1. 	 By enforcing duty (I) and 
2. 	 By designing institutions that avoid the creation of strong incentives to 
violate duty (I). 
III. To aid the deprived 
1. 	 Who are one's special responsibility, 
2. 	 Who are victims of social failures in the performance of duties (I), (II­
I), (11-2) and 
3. 	 Who are victims of natural disasters. 53 
The duty to avoid eliminating a person's only available means of subsistence 
applies to everyone in society and merely requires that one "refrain from making an 
unnecessary gain for oneself by a means that is destructive to others.,,54 According to 
Shue, duties to protect or to aid are "attached to certain roles or relationships and rest 
therefore upon only those who are in a particular role or relationship and are borne 
toward only those other persons directly involved.,,55 Thus, these two duties - to protect 
and to aid - do not necessarily fall upon all individual members of a society, but, more 
specifically, these duties fall upon the governing body of the particular society in 
question. 
Shue suggests that the government should be expected to enforce the primary 
duties that correlate with basic rights since the government legitimizes itself (at least in 
some respect) by acting on the behalf of the members of society.56 Certain individuals or 
groups of individuals within a society may be charged with a duty to protect others 
against deprivation or to aid the deprived, but such duties arise out of particular 
relationships in which the duty-bearer is the guardian of the right-holder.57 For instance, a 
parent is charged with all three duties to her children in virtue of her guardian role. 
So, individuals have basic rights to security and subsistence, which are necessary 
both for their autonomous moral development and for the enjoyment of all other rights. 
All individuals within society (both global and local) have a moral duty to avoid 
unnecessarily depriving persons of their basic rights. If persons are deprived of the 
objects of their basic rights, the individuals' home government is obliged to both protect 
against further deprivation and provide aid for the deprived. Moreover, the home 
government is not the only entity (or individual) responsible for protecting and aiding the 
53 Ibid., 53 & 60. 
54 Ibid., 55. Shue does not make the following claim, but some might argue that it may be necessary in 
times of extreme resource scarcity that one deprive others of adequate food, shelter, or clothing in order for 
one to provide for oneself or for one's dependents. In such a situation, one is choosing one's own survival 
or the survival of one's dependents over others, which seems (at most) morally permissible under 
circumstances involving extreme resource scarcity. 
55 Ibid., 56. 
56 Ibid. 

57 In the case of a multinational corporation, Shue claims that such duties should be fulfilled by the home 
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deprived: certain relationships fonned between individuals (or groups of individuals) may 
grant the right-holder a legitimate moral claim on the other individual (or group) involved 
in the relationship. 
Section 3.2: Terminator Technology and Basic Rights 
At this point, I would like to address some of the claims made against Terminator 
Technology in Chapter 2. The activists' major objection to the potential implementation 
of Terminator Technology is that it is "immoral" because it infringes upon a fanner's 
right to save the seed of her harvest for planting the next season's crop. In Chapter 2, I 
interpreted this claim to mean that implementing Terminator Technology will necessarily 
infringe upon a fanner's right to subsistence, namely adequate food. This may not only 
mean that resource-poor fanners are denied adequate food but also that they may be 
denied the means of economic viability required to purchase adequate food, water, 
shelter, etc. To adequately evaluate the critics' claims opposing Tenninator Technology, 
we must first understand why this technology was developed and the context in which it 
will be implemented, which will include searching for a justification for a "right to save 
seeds." 
Terminator Technology was not developed without necessity. Apparently the 
impetus for the creation and development of this novel technology was to ensure that 
plant breeders' intellectual property rights would actually be protected. The practice of 
putting patents on agricultural plants is nothing new and has been available since 1930.58 
Although patenting has been available for the past 74 years, it has lacked the power to 
completely protect the intellectual property of persons or corporations. Prior to the recent 
techno-era, intellectual property protection required extensive policing to catch patent 
violators. Even after a culprit was caught using a corporation's intellectual property 
without authorization (usage is typically authorized in the fonn of a payment made to the 
corporation), the corporation would have to take litigious action against the culprit. Both 
policing and convicting unauthorized use of a corporation's intellectual property is 
expensive for the corporation, which may diminish the amount of capital a finn can 
invest in research and development.59 It is very difficult (and perhaps impossible) to 
completely guard against the unauthorized use of agricultural products due two factors: 1) 
the impossibility of testing each and every organism for genetic fingerprinting, and 2) 
remotely controlling an organism that is free to replicate itself. So, how better to 
efficiently and effectively prohibit the unauthorized usage of a corporation's intellectual 
58 Jack Wilson, "Intellectual Property Rights in Genetically Modified Agriculture: The Shock of the Not­

So-New," in Genetically Modified Foods: Debating Biotechnology, eds. Michael Ruse and David Castle 
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property than to empower the property with a self-regulating capability? Hence: the 
dawn ofGURTs.6o 
For commercial plant breeders, intellectual property protection involves either 
manipulating the seed itself or the farmers who purchases the seeds, and the more that 
one is manipulated the freer the other becomes.61 Consequently, if the plants cannot be 
manipulated to ensure the protection of a finn's intellectual property, then the finn must 
attempt to manipulate the fanner in order to gain a return on their investment.62 At least 
from the commercial breeders' perspective, manipulating their seeds through the use of 
GURTs is a much more efficient and effective way of protecting their intellectual 
property. Also, as pointed out above, Terminator Technology will (once widely 
implemented in the commercial seed industry) prohibit farmers from sowing the seeds 
from their harvest, which is the intended purpose of this technology. 
The question that needs to be addressed at this point is: Does Terminator 
Technology wrongfully prohibit farmers from saving their seeds? If prohibiting farmers 
from saving their seeds is wrong, the activists opposing Terminator Technology fail to 
demonstrate why this is wrong. Attempting to take an objective view, we can see that 
both commercial plant breeders and resource-poor farmers have rights at stake here ­
each have a right to reap the returns of their investments. Such a right stems from the 
right to own property as detailed in the UDHR.63 On the one side we can see that 
commercial plant breeders have a right to seek (or expect) a return on their investment of 
capital in the research and development of certain modified crops such as Bt cotton and 
Roundup soybeans. For example, to have a right to own property but not a right to reap 
the benefits of the property would imply that one has a right but does not deserve to enjoy 
the object of the right. Owning property is not necessarily intrinsically valuable, one 
enjoys such a right insofar as one is capable of (or allowed to) reaping the benefits of the 
property. On the other side, resource-poor farmers have the right to command the fruits of 
their labor such as saving or sharing the seeds of their harvests. 
However, neither the plant breeder nor the farmer has a right to profit (or benefit 
in some respect) from property that is not theirs. Even though breeders currently have a 
legal right to expect remuneration for the subsequent use of their patented seeds (since 
they legally own such seeds), it is still morally disputed that the fruits of patented plants 
belong to those breeders. If it can be demonstrated that breeders have a moral right to 
patent organisms that they significantly alter, then it would be morally unjustifiable to 
claim that farmers have a right to save patented GM seeds. But that claim is beyond the 
60 Use restriction technology of particular plant varieties has been in place for several years now, but this 
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scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, from a legal perspective, commercial plant breeders do 
not have a right to patent organisms that they did not significantly alter, nor do farmers 
have a right to share or save patented seeds. To affirm such rights would be, in effect, to 
affirm a right to what is from a legal standpoint thievery. 
In order to get at the exact reason (or set of reasons) that makes prohibiting 
farmers from saving their seeds "immoral," we must first examine what the opposition 
might mean when they say that farmers have a "right" to save their seeds. When people 
use the term "rights" to refer to some inalienable access to something (such as food, 
healthcare, freedom, etc.), they are sometimes confused as to what legitimate claims they 
J 
t 
can make on others in the name of rights. As I argued above, individuals have a basic 
right to security and subsistence. A right to save seeds appears to be derived from a basic 
j 
right to subsistence even though no specific "right to save seeds" is actually 
acknowledged by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations or any 
other "neutral" organization. Apparently, the ETC group merely assumes that such a 
right should exist. According to the ETC group, " ... the FAD Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture has been negotiating revisions to the Undertaking. 
RAPI has followed these negotiations closely, and has worked to influence their outcome. 
We have pressed for a broad interpretation of 'Farmer's Rights' including the right to 
save seeds...."64 Consequently, the ETC group (then RAPI) was unsuccessful in 
establishing a "right" to save seeds and seems to merely assume that such a right should f
! exist. 
The ETC group may appeal to Shue's argument above as supporting their claim 
that implementing Terminator Technology is "immoral" since it necessarily infringes 
upon farmers' right to subsistence. In an attempt to evaluate the ETC group's potential 
claim, we need to answer the following two questions. Is a right to saving seeds 
inherently necessary to the enjoyment of a right to subsistence? If so, are MACs 
infringing upon the farmers' right to subsistence by disallowing them to save the seeds of 
their harvest? To answer the first question: Saving seeds is not an essential part of the 
enjoyment of a right to subsistence since one is still free to enjoy the right to subsistence 
even if one is unable to save seeds. Admittedly, farmers in poor nations do not have 
many viable alternatives to eke a meager living for themselves and their dependants, but 
being allowed to save GM seeds is not inherently necessary to obtaining adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, etc. To be very clear: MACs are not actually preventing farmers from 
saving all seeds. 
According to Shue, basic rights are to be guaranteed by the home government or a 
multilateral government action.65 MACs may have a moral obligation to avoid 
64 The ETC group, "RAPI Annual Report: September 1997 August 1998," 
http://www.etcgroup.org/documentsireport98.PDF (27 March 2004). The FAO explicitly states that it 
adheres to the United Nations UDHR and more specific to agricultural practices, that all people have a right 
to food. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Report on the Panel of Eminent 
Experts on Ethics in Food and Agriculture," (Rome 2(03) 
http://www.fao.orgIDOCREP/0051Y8265EIY8265EOO.HfM (03 August 2004). Apparently the ETC 
group and others believe that in order to ensure a person's right to food farmers must be granted the right to 
save the seeds of their harvest. 
65 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 56. 
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eliminating the fanners' only available means of subsistence and to refrain from making 
an unnecessary gain by means that are illegitimately destructive to the fanners.66 First of 
all, there is no clear case of tangible hanns resulting from the implementation of 
Terminator Technology, since this technology has yet to be released from the laboratory 
into the global agricultural market.67 Some opponents of Terminator Technology, such as 
Dr. Swaninathan, are concerned that the chemicals used to switch on the terminator gene 
may make the seeds unsafe to consume, which could be construed as a sort of direct hann 
resulting from Terminator Technology. Tetracycline (an antibiotic) is typically applied to 
the Fl generation of seeds, which triggers a gene to produce RIP (ribosome inhibitor 
protein), which inhibits embryo development in the F2 generation, thereby rendering the 
F2 seeds sterile. It has not been proven that tetracycline will actual1 y affect the safe 
consumption of F2 seeds. Moreover, the tetracycline may be washed off or biodegraded 
during the growing season leaving the crops tetracycline free. The main concern here is 
that people or animals may be hanned if the Fl seed is directly consumed instead of 
planted. However, it is implausible to think that people will knowingly purchase 
genetically modified Fl seeds from breeders for direct consumption since these seeds will 
probably be more expensive than seeds intended to be eaten. Moreover, the application 
of chemicals such as tetracycline is not the only or preferred method for inducing the 
terminator gene. The induction may be either chemical or physical (e.g. osmotic shock or 
temperature shock).68 So, in the event that certain chemical inducers are proven to cause 
health problems when treated seeds are directly consumed, commercial seed breeders 
should be required to adopt a physical method of induction to avoid causing direct 
physical hann to animals or humans.69 
Moreover, some critics claim that the pollen of genetically modified crops 
containing the terminator gene may drift to neighboring stands, potentially fertilizing the 
non-OM plants, and possibly rendering the harvested seeds sterile.7o In addition to the 
potential negative socioeconomic consequences of implementing terminator technology, 
66 Ibid., 55. 
67 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Potential Impacts of Genetic Use Restriction 
Technologies (GURTs) on Agricultural Biodiversity and Agricultural Production Systems, (Rome: 2001), 
4; Hemy Daniell, "Molecular Strategies for Gene Containment in Transgenic Crops," Nature 
Biotechnology 20, (June 2002): 586; National Research Council of the National Academies, Biological 
Confinement of Genetically Engineered Organisms (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
2004), 72. 
68 Hemy Daniell, "Molecular Strategies for Gene Containment in Transgenic Crops," Nature Biotechnology 
20, (June 2002): 583. 
69 One other possibility would be to engineer the seeds in such a way as to require the application of 
tetracycline to switch off the terminator construct. Consequently, during the breeding process before sale, 
seeds would be treated with tetracycline in order to tum the terminator construct off, allowing breeders to 
continue producing more seeds. The application of such a method would mean that the terminator seed 
sold would never have been treated with tetracycline and would not be responsible for any adverse health 
effects that this antibiotic might cause. Cullen N. Pendleton, "The Peculiar Case of 'Terminator' 
Technology: Agricultural Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Protection at the Crossroads of the Third 
Green Revolution," Biotechnology Law Report 23, no. 1 (2004): 7; Niels P. Louwaars et aI., "Policy 
Response to Technological Developments: The Case of GURTs," Journal ofNew Seeds 4, no. 1-2 (2002): 
91; Stuart Smyth, George G. Khachatourians, and Peter W.B. Phillips, "Liabilities and Economics of 
Transgenic Crops," Nature Biotechnology 20 (June 2002): 541. 




there is concern that the introgression of unique phenotypes (such as herbicide tolerance 
or drought resistance) may give wild relatives a fitness edge. Although gene flow 
between crops and wild relati ves has occurred for centuries, the potential introgression of 
novel genes (such as those that produce herbicide tolerance or drought resistance) into 
wild populations poses some serious problems. If the outcrossing of certain genes gives a 
wild relative a fitness advantage, the particular species has the potential to become 
invasive.71 If this potentiality becomes a reality, critics claim that this would imperil poor 
nations' food security and destroy resource-poor farmers' only means of subsistence. 
Before directly dealing with this criticism, a brief description of the science behind gene 
flow may be helpful. 
First of all, the science behind genetic drift is far from developed. There currently 
exists a paucity of interdisciplinary research on the actual ecological and agronomic 
I 
( impacts of trasgene flow.72 One important thing to keep in mind is that, according to 
Henry Daniell, 
... gene flow depends on several variables: the specific crop, its location, 
the presence of outcrossing wild relatives/sexually compatible crops, the 
competitive nature (advantages and disadvantages) of the introduced trait, 
and the environmental consequences of traits. Two mechanisms are 
responsible for the movement of genes among crops and their wild 
relatives/related crops: dispersal in viable pollen or dissemination in seed 
(the latter germinates and produces viable pollen). 
The potential for gene flow through pollen depends on such 
variables as the amount of pollen produced, longevity of pollen, dispersal 
of pollen (as by wind or animals), plant/weed density, 
dormancy/rehydration of pollen, survival of pollen from toxic substances 
secreted by pollinators, the distance between crops and weeds, and 
whether these plants are sexually receptive to the crop.73 
Consequently, it is not yet possible to accurately predict the exact outcrossing rates for 
every crop variety due to the multiple variables that must be taken into consideration 
when attempting to discern the probability of transgene flow actually occurring. 
Current scientific evidence proves that transgenes are essentially no different from 
other genes in that both disperse and become incorporated into the genomes of other, 
71 N.C. Ellstrand, "Gene Flow from Transgenic Crops to Wild Relatives: What Have Learned, What Do We 
Know, What Do We Need to Know?" in Scientific Methods Workshop: Ecological and Agronomic 
Consequences of Gene Flow from Transgenic Crops to Wild Relatives (Columbus, OH: 2002): 41. 
Available at http://www.bioscLohio-state.eduJ-asnowlablProceedings.pdf ; Allison A. Snow, "Transgenic 
Crops - why gene flow matters," Nature Biotechnology 20 (June 2002): 542. 
72 Allison A. Snow, "Transgenic Crops why gene flow matters," Nature Biotechnology 20 (June 2002): 
542. 
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related plants.74 However, outcrossing theories based on conventional agricultural models 
cannot adequately predict the unintended consequences of transgene introgression?5 
Merely acknowledging that the mode of transgene introgression is the same as 
conventional gene introgression does not reveal much about how transgenes behave once 
incorporated into other genomes. Unfortunately, the current framework for 
understanding how transgenes behave is based on conventional agriculture models, and 
due to the novelty of transgenes, the techniques used in current agricultural models are 
not able to adequately predict the transfer of traits at the molecular level.76 Despite the 
increased research aimed at understanding the ecological and agronomic impacts of 
transgene flow, there remains an inabilit~ to effectively predict the real-world 
consequences of commercializing transgenes.7 It is currently impossible to completely 
prevent gene flow between sexually compatible species ~rowing in the same area since 
pollen and seeds disperse too widely and too easily. 8 There is little information 
available concerning the actual dispersion of pollen for different crops in the field,79 but 
one study found that canola pollen can drift anywhere from 2.5 to 25,000 meters, wheat 
pollen can drift between 48 and 400 meters, and com pollen can drift as far as 50 
meters. so 
One shortcoming of the current outcrossing studies is that these experiments only 
take into consideration the unimpeded rate of outcrossing. This means that if wheat (for 
example) is demonstrated to have a maximum outcrossing rate of 6.1 %, this rate does not 
include the presence of a physical barrier. The main problem is that there are no standard 
outcrossing rates for particular crop varieties. The reported outcrossing rate for 10 
74 Allison A. Snow, "Transgenic Crops why gene flow matters," Nature Biotechnology 20 (June 2002): 

542; N.C. Ellstrand, "Gene Flow from Transgenic Crops to Wild Relatives: What Have Learned, What Do 
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" Canadian spring wheat cultivars, for example, is between 0.3% and 6.1 % without the 
imposition of a physical barrier. 81 Without a standard outcrossing rate, we could not 
adequately determine the effectiveness of the barrier. The main point here is that there 
are a variety of variables contributing to the different outcrossing rates that a particular 
species will have, and without a standardized outcrossing rate for each crop, physical 
barriers cannot be effectively evaluated. 
Nevertheless, factors such as various flowering times, isolation zones, and barrier 
crops can only reduce the rate of outcrossing - if sexually compatible plant varieties exist 
within dispersal zones, transgenes will escape.82 Since physical means of containing 
transgenes may prove to offer an unacceptably high level of outcrossing, biological 
confinement methods might offer an adequate level of trans gene confinement.83 
Currently there are approximately eight bioconfinement methods being developed for 
agricultural and horticultural uses (Table 1). Apparently, bioconfinement research is an 
attempt to create a responsible method for containing transgenes so as to inhibit their 
escape into the natural environment, limiting the potential negative consequence that 
transgenic organisms may cause in natural ecosystems. 
One such bioconfinement method is seed sterility (Terminator Technology), 
which is Monsanto's chosen method for prohibiting the unauthorized perpetual use of 
certain plant varieties. None of the other bioconfinement methods have received as much 
(if any) criticism for their potential implementation in commercial markets. Granted, a 
few of the methods do not prohibit the continued use of the entire plant, but all are 
intended to control certain genetically modified characteristics of particular plant 
varieties. 
81 P. Hucl and M. Matus-Cadiz, "Isolation Distances for Minimizing Out-Crossing in Spring Wheat," Crop 
Science 41 (2001): 1348. 
82 James Hancock, "A Framework for Assessing the Risk of Transgenic Crops," BioScience 53, no. 5 (May 
2(03): 513. The effectiveness of isolation zones depends on the how a crops pollen or seed is dispersed. 
The impact of isolation zones on the outcrossing of insect-pollinated crops is dependent upon insect 
behavior. That is, experiments must demonstrate various isolation zone widths ability to deter insects from 
moving from one crop to another. Barrier crops may reduce the amount of pollen dispersed to other fields 
by absorbing some of the wind-blown GM pollen. Also these crops would consist of flowering varieties 
that distribute their own pollen (these crops should not be sexually compatible with neighboring crops) in 
order to dilute pollen drifting between crops and entice vector insects to visit their flowers before visiting 
the next crop (the latter are called trap crops). Katie Eastham and Jeremy Sweet, Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs): The Significance of Gene Flow through Pollen Transfer (Copenhagen, Germany: 
European Environmental Agency, 2(02): 59. Available at 
http://reports.eea.eu.intJenvironmental issue report 2002 28/enlGMOs%20for%20www.pdf. 
Morris et al found that barrier crops significantly reduced gene escape, but even with the lowest outcrossing 
rate of 0.94%, genes managed to escape into neighboring fields. William F. Morris, Peter M. Kareiva, Paul 
L. Raymer, "Do Barren Zones and Pollen Traps Reduce Gene Escape from Transgenic Crops?" Ecological 
Applications 4, no. 1 (1994): 157-165. 
83 Gene flow is a real concern and horticultural experiments have demonstrated that outcrossing can occur 
between crops and wild relatives. Norman Ellstrand, "When Transgenes Wonder, Should We Worry?" 
Plant Physiology 125 (April 2001):1543-1545; James F. Hancock, "A Framework for Assessing the Risk 
of Transgenic Crops," BioScience 53, no. 5 (May 2(03): 512-519; Anne-Marie Chevre et aI., "Gene Flow 
from Transgenic Crops," Nature 389 (30 October 1997): 924; Joy Bergelson, Colin B. Purrington, and Gale 




Table 1: Current and Future Technologies for Transgene Containment84 
Techniqlle85 Advantages Disadvantages Status 
Maternal Inheritance86 
Prevent gene flow 
through outcrossing and 
volunteer seeds. 
Relatively well 
developed. Field tsts 
indicate low incidence 
of sympatry and mixed 
stands extinct in three 
years. High level of 
trans gene expression 
and no evidence for 
gene silencing or 
position effects. 
Techniques to export 
protein are not yet 
available. Foreign 
proteins have not been 
targeted to ER for 
glycosylation. 
Demonstrated in 
tobacco, potato, and 
tomato. Further 
development required to 




Shelf-life of flowers 
may also be extended. 
Several tapetum-specific 
promoters available. 
Crop needs to be 
propagated by 
crosspollination from 
non-GM crop or by 
artificial seeds. Potential 










volunteer seed dispersal. 
If trans gene is silenced, 
introgression will occur. 
All linked genes should 
segregate together. 
Terminator technology 
has not been 
demonstrated in the 
field. RBF demonstrated 
in tobacco. 
84 Henry Daniell, "Molecular Strategies for Gene Containment in Transgenic Crops," Nature Biotechnology 
20, (June 2002): 582. 
85 See Henry Daniell's article "Molecular Strategies for Gene Containment in Transgenic Crops." Nature 
Biotechnology 20, (June 2002): 581-586 for a brief description of the following bioconfinement techniques. 
86 Recent controversy suggests that the use of chloroplast engineering involved in maternal inheritance may 
allow the transfer of trans genes to outcross. Daniell and Parkinson respond to this alleged problem by 
stating that even if trans genes are passed on to other plants, the trans genes will not be functional and 
consequently will not be able to alter phenotypic expressions. Henry Daniell and Christopher L. Parkinson, 
"Jumping Genes and Containment," Nature Biotechnology 21 (April 2003): 374-375. 
87 Male sterility may not be a viable option for bioconfinement since some transgenic varieties containing 
male sterility components have been found to outcross to other fully fertile GM crops at a higher rate and at 
greater distances than with conventional crops. This means that conventional isolation distances used to 
separate crops containing male sterility components from non-GM crops will have to be increased to avoid 
outcrossing between GM crops. Katie Eastham and Jeremy Sweet, Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs): The Significance of Gene Flow through Pollen Transfer (Copenhagen, Germany: European 
Environmental Agency, 2002): 59. Available at 
http://reports.eea.eu.intlenvironmental issue report 2002 28/enlGMOs%20for%20www.pdf ViKtor 
Kuvshinov et aI., "Molecular Control of Transgene Escape from Genetically Modified Plants," Plant 
Science 160 (2001): 518. 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Technique Advantages Disadvantages Status 
Cleistogamy 
Pollination occurs 
before flower opens, 
theoretically preventing 
outcrossing. 
Genes to modify floral 
design not readily 
available. In practice, 
introgression occurs 
despite self-pollination. 
Not yet demonstrated in 
transgenic crops. 
Apomixis 
Seed is of vegetable 
origin and not from 
sexual cross. Controls 
both outcrossing and 
volunteer seed dispersal. 
Hybrid traits can be 
fixed. 
Only known is a few 
crops. Genes not yet 
available. 





May not be applicable to 
crops that exhibit 
homologous 
recombination. Crops 
will not produce seed 
unless propagated with 
compatible plants. 
Not yet demonstrated in 
transgenic crops. 
Temporal and Tissue-
Specific Control via 
Inducible Promoters 
Gene either activated 
onl y when product is 
necessary or excised 
before flowering. 
May not be applicable to 
traits required 
throughout the plant's 
life. If chemical 
treatment fails to 
penetrate plant tissues, 
residual levels of 
trangene may be present 
in pollen or seed that 
could be outcrossed. 
Not yet demonstrated in 
transgenic crops. 
Transgenic Mitigation 
Neutral for crops but 
harmful for weeds. 
Does not address gene 
flow and may force wild 
relatives to extinction. 






Seemingly the main difference between Terminator Technology (seed sterility) 
and other bioconfinement methods is that the Terminator is the only method explicitly 
designed to restrict the usage of particular genetically modified plant varieties. Even 
though the other methods have not yet been touted as genetic use restriction technologies, 
they could be used for such a purpose. The main drawback to using terminator 
technology as a bioconfinement tool is that it may prove to be a "leaky" technology.88 
This means that the LEA (late embryonic abundance) promoter may become silenced. If 
the LEA promoter is silenced, the RIP (ribosomal inactivating protein) would not be 
produced at the end of the seed development, allowing the seed to grow and disperse its 
trans genes. 89 Also, when treating the seeds with tetracycline before being sold, the 
chemical may not induce the terminator construct, thereby permitting the seed to grow 
and propagate.90 
Once Terminator Technology is ready to be released from the laboratory, small­
scale field tests that introduce limited numbers of transgenic crops should be conducted 
under conditions that minimize transgene flow so as to mitigate the widespread 
environmental and socioeconomic impacts.91 Furthermore, field-tests are essential to 
understanding how transgenic plants, including those containing the GURTs, will react 
once released into the natural environment.92 Laboratory studies, albeit very useful, 
cannot replicate the matrix of environmental conditions, and for this reason lab 
experiments are very limited in their predictive abilities.93 Given that various crops 
disperse seed and pollen in different ways (some crops use vector insects and others rely 
on wind currents) each transgenic crop variety should be evaluated and field-tested on a 
case-by-case method.94 A vast array of unforeseen negative consequences could result 
from testing a novel technology such as Terminator Technology on only one plant 
variety, which necessitates field-testing each crop variety before making it available for 
commercial use. 
So, if GMOs continue to be used to increase the agronomic benefit of certain 
crops, then the most environmentally responsible method would include the use of some 
sort of bioconfinement mechanism. But, we have not yet answered the question that 
88 Mae-Wan Ho, Joe Cummins, and Jeremy Bartlett, "The Killing Fields Near You: Terminator Crops at 
Large," Institute ofScience in Society Newsletter 7/8 (February 2001). Available at 
http://www.i-sis.org.uklisisnews/i-sisnews7-16.php. Katie Eastham and Jeremy Sweet, Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs): The Significance of Gene Flow through Pollen Transfer (Copenhagen, 
Germany: European Environmental Agency, 2002): 59. Available at 
http://reports.eea.eu.int/environmental issue report 2002 28/enlGMOs%20for%20www.pdf. 
89 Henry Daniell, "Molecular Strategies for Gene Containment in Transgenic Crops," Nature Biotechnology 
20, (June 2002): 584. 
90 Manuela Giovannetti, "The Ecological Risks of Transgenic Plants," Rivista di Biologia / Biology Forum 
96 (2003): 218. 
91 James M. Tiedje et aI., ''The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Ecological 
Considerations and Recommendations," Ecology 70, no. 2 (April 1989): 304. 
92 L.L. Wolfenbarger and P.R. Phifer, ''The Ecological Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered 
Plants," Science 290 (December 2000): 2088-2093. 
93 James M. Tiedje et aI., ''The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Ecological 
Considerations and Recommendations," Ecology 70, no. 2 (April 1989): 306. 
94 James M. Tiedje et aI., ''The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Ecological 
Considerations and Recommendations," Ecology 70, no. 2 (April 1989): 307. 
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started this discussion: If Terminator Technology is implemented in commercial markets, 
will the outcrossing of the terminator gene render resource-poor farmers' crops sterile? 
That is, will terminator genes outcross to neighboring crops? Well, there is no evidence 
proving that terminator genes will act differently than other transgenes, suggesting that 
they too will outcross to neighboring crops. 95 But the actual environmental and 
socioeconomic consequences of terminator genes outcrossing has yet to be determined.96 
One thing is certain, though: Terminator genes will not necessarily destroy resource­
farmers only means of subsistence and it will not inevitably imperil a nation's food 
security. It is not the case that, as the doomsayers imagine, a demoniac cloud of pollen 
spawned from terminator crops will drift across the land spreading the seed of destruction 
and sterility - the worst case scenario will not reach such catastrophic proportions. 
Granted, if the terminator genes do outcross and fertilize neighboring crops, unsuspecting 
farmers may be negatively affected, but such a situation would not completely destroy a 
resource-poor farmer's ability to grow a crop. The worst case scenario, according to 
Louwaars et aI, suggests that 20 % (probably less) of a farmer's saved seed would not 
grow due to the introgression of the terminator gene, leaving the farmer with 
approximately 80% of her intended crop.97 
Even though this concern is very serious in that it may destroy farmers' only 
means of subsistence, the probability of this negative effect actually occurring due to the 
implementation of Terminator Technology may be very low given the numerous gene 
recombination events that would need to occur to produce sterile seeds in neighboring 
crops. Furthermore, if field tests prove that a significant number of compatible plant 
relatives neighboring transgenic crops produce sterile seeds, then redundant confinement 
tools may be necessary to prevent pollen drifts. This would require that in addition to a 
bioconfinement method such as seed sterility, a farmer would be required to implement 
physical barriers such as isolation zones and barrier crops. But, again, the effectiveness 
of such a redundant transgene confinement system would need to be field-tested before 
commerci alized. 
95 Cullen N. Pendleton, "The Peculiear Case of 'Terminator' Techology: Agricultural Biotechnology and 
Intellectual Property Protection at the Crossroads of the Third Green Revolution," Biotechnology Law 
Report 23, no. 1 (2004): 13. 
% According to Louwaars et aI, "Farmers who produce their non-GURT crops adjacent to large areas of V­
GURT fields of the same crop will face viability problems when using there own seed. In self-fertilizing 
crops like most cereals, pulses and cotton, cross fertilization rarely exceeds 2%, and viability losses will be 
negligible. Such minor reductions in seed viability are commonly compensated for by increased numbers 
of ears per plant in cereals and by increased leaf area per plant in legumes. Introgression in truly cross­
fertilizing species (like maize and oilseed rape) may, however, go well beyond 20%, when small fields of 
local crops are surrounded by large areas of GURT crops. This will have a significant negative effect on 
crop yields." Niels P. Louwaars, Bert Visser, Derek Eaton, et aI., "Policy Response to Technological 
Developments: The Case of GURTs," Journal of New Seeds 4, no. 1-2 (2002): 94. The actual percentage 
of inviable seeds produced in neighboring fields will depend upon the amount of pollen or seeds drifting, 
which is influenced by the plant species, plant variety, weather conditions, proximity of fields, etc. Martha 
L. Crouch, "How the Terminator Terminates," The Edmonds Institute, Edmonds, Wash., 1998. Available 

at http://www.biotech-info.netfhowto.html . 

97 Niels P. Louwaars, Bert Visser, Derek Eaton, et aI., "Policy Response to Technological Developments: 
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Still, what if a worst case scenario obtained? Who, exactly, should be responsible 
for compensating the farmer's losses? The easy answer is the MAC that created and 
commercialized the product.98 It seems reasonable for the MAC to be held at least 
partially responsible for the products it produces. If this assertion is acceptable, then it 
would also be reasonable to require MACs to help support food aid organizations that 
would respond to resource-poor farmers' needs in the case that even a small percentage 
of their crops fail to grow. I understand that many resource-poor farmers are living on 
the razors edge of existence, and any decrease in crop production may send them into a 
downward spiral. Granted there are numerous variables that contribute to decreased crop 
production in a given season such as unfavorable weather conditions, climate changes, 
insect infestations, etc. All of these in isolation may have a negligible affect on crop 
production, making it very difficult for a particular resource-poor farmer to point her 
finger at Terminator Technology, which may only cause a 2% decrease in yields, as the 
cause of her low crop yield. It still stands to reason that if MACs realize (after 
conducting field-tests) that the commercialization of Terminator Technology has a 
relatively high probability of negatively affecting neighboring crops, even at a very low 
percentage, the MACs have a moral obligation to mitigate the suffering that their 
products may cause. 
Additionally, there are some serious concerns associated with the potential 
implementation of Terminator Technology such as the possible isolation of genepools 
used within the seed industry. Throughout most of the world, there are two distinct but 
interacting seed delivery systems: the formal seed supply sector, which is comprised of 
international breeders and private national breeders (both are typically regulated by 
governments), and the informal seed supply sector, which predominantly consists of 
cooperative relationships formed between farmers breeding their own seeds.99 Due to the 
current absence of an absolutely effective method of protecting intellectual property, 
genetic material that is improved by one sector finds its way into the other sector which is 
then used to make improvements to certain varieties. Without the use of Terminator 
Technology both sectors are able to use one another's germplasm to improve their own. 
Once Terminator Technology is implemented in the commercial seed industry the 
international breeding companies and the national breeders will be able to control the 
usage of their respective germplasm, which will most likely result in the formal and 
informal seed sectors becoming more isolated from one another. The local farming 
operations that breed their own seeds, and typically lack the financial resources to 
purchase seeds from the formal seed sector, are most likely to be harmed by such 
98 But, what if the farmer using this product did not adhere to the terms of proper use such as creating an 
isolation zone or implementing some means of physical confinement that would further minimize the 
probability of outcrossing? Currently there are no such proper use terms associated with GURTs, but as 
with any risky technology the agent using the product must also assume at least partial responsibility for 
any ill effects that using the product may cause. However, this issue takes the discussion too far afield, for 
such a discussion would require an extensive explanation of product liability. 
99 Derek Eaton, et aI., "Economic and Policy Aspects of 'Terminator' Technology," Biotechnology and 
Development Monitor 49 (2002): 19-22; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
"Potential Impacts of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) on Agricultural Biodiversity and 





isolation.100 While this would be a negative consequence of implementing Terminator 
Technology, especially in developing countries, the innovation-absorption gap between 
the formal and informal sectors could effectively be reduced by increased investments in 
public plant breeding initiatives. 101 
To more accurately determine the impact that Terminator Technology may have 
on farming systems we must determine the level of input that a particular farming system 
uses, since the higher dependence on purchased inputs renders a particular farming 
system more likely to encounter this technology. In our modem world, farming has 
evolved from a subsistence activity to a commercial enterprise which has led to the need 
for an increasing amount of agricultural inputs in order to maximize the yield of certain 
crops. 102 Within the global agricultural industry there are at least three general 
classifications of farming systems: high-intensity farming systems, which depend heavily 
on the formal seed sector for all inputs; medium-intensity farming systems, which depend 
partly on the formal seed sector but depend mostly upon the informal seed sector; and 
low-intensity farming systems, which depend highly on the informal seed sector. 103 
Currently, in developing countries, medium-intensity farming accounts for the majority 
of agricultural production, low-intensity farming systems account for most of the 
remainder of the production, and high-intensity farming systems currently account for a 
relatively small amount of the production.104 Both medium- and low-intensity farming 
systems are considered "resource-poor" farming systems since both are dependent (to 
various degrees) on the informal seed sector and lack the economic means to rely on the 
formal sector for their agricultural inputs. 1Os Medium-intensity farming systems are most 
susceptible to the potential negative impacts of the implementation of Terminator 
Technology (such as decreased yields in subsequent years) since they are only partially 
dependant upon the formal seed sector and typically could not afford to purchase seed 
each year. These farmers might be forced to develop a greater dependence on the formal 
seed sector if Terminator Technology were to be widely implemented since using 
terminator seeds may initiate a cycle of perpetual annual seed purchases. Again, the 
medium- and low-intensity farming systems in developing countries could be insulated 
from the negative economic impacts of the implementation of Terminator Technology by 
initiatives designed to increase investments in public plant breeding, thereby granting 
these farmers an alternative to dealing with the formal seed supply sector. 106 
Additionally, the application of Terminator Technology will be confined to crops 
that are currently being genetically modified. That is, not all crops are targets for this 
100 Derek Eaton, et aI., "Economic and Policy Aspects of 'Terminator' Technology," Biotechnology and 
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technology, only those crops that are significantly modified and patented by 
agrochemical coroorations (e.g., wheat, soybeans, and cotton) will be imbued with 
terminator genes. 07 Given that genetically modified varieties are typically much more 
expensive than seeds purchased from the informal seed sector, many medium-intensity 
farmers, and probably all low-intensity farmers, will not be able to purchase seeds 
possessing the terminator gene. There is concern, though, that if improperly controlled, 
the terminator seeds could leak into the informal seed sector reeking havoc for resource­
poor farmer. However, if a sufficient public plant breeding system is in place, farmers 
who inadvertently sow "suicide seeds" would be able to replenish their seed stores in 
subsequent years. 108 
Since the implementation of Terminator Technology has not yet been proven to 
instantiate an unnecessary gain for MACs nor that it is illegitimately destructive to the 
farmers, MACs have yet to be proven deserving of the moral condemnation given them 
by activist groups such as the ETC group. As long as farmers are able to make an 
informed, autonomous choice to use terminator seeds they would not necessarily be 
deprived of their right to subsistence merely by using terminator seeds. 
So, even though many activist groups adamantly claim that MACs have a duty to 
respect the right of farmers to save the seeds of their harvest, even if it is the case that the 
MACs have invested more time and resources into the production of certain varieties of 
seeds, such a right does not actually exist. If such a right is found to be morally 
justifiable, it has yet to be proven that MACs have a direct, moral obligation to protect 
this right of farmers. 
J. 
107 Actually, not all patented varieties will have the terminator gene since some hybrid varieties can be 
controlled through other "natural" mechanisms. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
"Potential Impacts of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) on Agricultural Biodiversity and 
Ar!cultural Production Systems, (Rome: 2001),4. 
10 In a worse-case scenario, a particular resource-poor farmer would sow a complete crop of "suicide 
seeds", save some of her harvested seeds for the subsequent year's crop, and, in the next season, find out 
that the sown seeds are sterile. I understand that such a situation could possibly financially devastate a 
resource-poor farmer. However, the probability of such a situation actually occurring must be researched 
before we can use such a scenario to completely oppose the implementation of Terminator Technology. 
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Chapter 4: Exploitation 

Even though MACs will not be infringing upon farmers rights through the 
potential implementation of Terminator Technology in the commercial seed industry, it 
may still be the case that MACs could use this technology to effectively reduce resource­
poor farmers to indentured servants, toiling to maximize profits for their corporate slave­
masters. The main question that will be addressed in this chapter is: Could the potential 
implementation of Terminator Technology be used by MACs to wrongfully exploit 
resource-poor farmers? In order to answer this question, I will first offer an in-depth 
discussion of what wrongful exploitation is and the necessary conditions for a situation to 
be wrongfully exploitative, which will include an explanation and critique of Judith 
Tormey's account of exploitation. 
Next, I will apply my conception of wrongful exploitation to the potential 
implementation of Terminator Technology. And finally, I will list the necessary 
conditions that must be met in order for the implementation of Terminator Technology to 
be accurately considered wrongfully exploitative. The main point that I will defend in 
this chapter is that the implementation of terminator technology is not necessarily 
wrongfully exploitative, but may become so if MACs illegitimately capitalize on farmers' 
vulnerabilities through the use of deceptive marketing schemes. 
By way of explanation, I use Tormey's account of exploitation not necessarily 
because it is the most robust theory of exploitation. Instead, Tormey's view is useful 
since her succinct conditions for exploitation seem to capture some very important 
aspects of exploitative relations (as will be demonstrated below). Furthermore, her view 
does not smack of a moralized account of exploitation as does Alan Wertheimer's view. 
Exploitation, as Wertheimer conceives of it, is always immoral. Alan Wood, on the other 
hand, understands exploitation to be a mere permutation of use, which does not 
necessarily connote wrongful use. In the present project, I intend to tease out distinct 
situations that involve using persons as a means to an end and those that involve using 
persons merely as a means to an end. 
It is pragmatically incorrect to deem it morally wrong for one to make productive 
use of(exploit) one's own talents or those of others in the pursuit of some legitimate goal. 
Exploiting one's own talents or those of others is necessary in most forms of uncoerced 
cooperation. For instance, when an employer exploits his labor force in order to 
maximize productivity, he does not necessarily treat his employees in an immoral 
manner. If the employer takes unfair advantage of his employees by using their 
vulnerabilities against them, and benefits from such an enterprise, then he may be guilty 
of wrongful exploitation. 
The major peril of espousing a moralized conception of exploitation is that claims 
such as "Donald's exploitation of his interns is wrong" become vacuous even though they 
may be true. In other words, moralized accounts of social concepts require that at least 
one truth condition describing such concepts be moral, rendering the need for further 
moral analysis redundant. 109 So, if I were to appeal to Wertheimer's account of 
109 Denis G. Arnold, "Exploitation and the Sweatshop Quandary," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 13 
(2003): 246. 
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exploitation, I could justifiably dispose of the following exegesis and defense of Judith 
Tormey's account of exploitation; however, I intend to defend an empirical notion of 
exploitation, which will require a defense of my moral position. 
Additionally, the respective accounts of Wood and Tormey appear to have much 
in common in that Tormey's conditions for exploitation essentially capture Wood's main 
explicative points regarding both non-moral exploitation and immoral exploitation. The 
main reason that I appeal to Tormey's account instead of Wood's is that Tormey makes 
explicit the distinction between exploitation and oppression. Within the field of the 
terminator debate, one can easily be confused by the language used by activist groups 
their attempt to articulate exactly what it is they find wrong with Terminator Technology. 
That is, one may wonder which term actually applies: exploitation or oppression. In an 
attempt to unearth a distinctive argument for why Terminator Technology is wrong from 
the activists' perspective, the (potentially) exploitative relation formed between MACs 
and resource-poor farmers appeared to be a more tangible project than that of the 
oppressive nature of Terminator Technology. The latter project would have required 
taking to task much more than the relationship formed between MACs and farmers, 
which seems to be too ponderous a project for a master's thesis. 
So, Tormey's account of exploitation appears to be the most pragmatically useful 
in dealing with the terminator debate, since: 1) it is not a moralized account, thereby 
allowing me to avoid the pitfalls associated with such accounts; and 2) it offers greater 
detail than Wood's account in that her conditions for exploitation are clearly defined, 
which makes easy the distinction between exploitation and oppression. 
Section 4.1: Judith Tormey's Conception of Exploitation 
Exploitation and oppression are terms that are sometimes used synonymously 
insofar as both loosely refer to an abusive relationship between two parties resulting in 
one party being treated unfairly. In an attempt to avoid stretching the meanings of both 
terms so far as to render them vacuous, we can make a simple but important distinction 
between exploitation and oppression. Oppression appears to affect people without 
necessarily involving a rational oppressor and furthermore, oppressors may not gain from 
oppressive relations. 11O For example, people can be oppressed by the economy without 
any group of individuals intending this state of affairs to obtain. Exploitation, on the 
other hand, requires an intentional act: one that necessarily results in gains for the 
exploiter. I II Even though there is a close relationship between exploitation and 
oppression, since many forms of oppression appear to facilitate exploitative relationships 
between groups, not all cases of exploitation include oppressive relations. I12 
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To begin, Judith Tonney offers a set of conditions for the existence of 
exploitation. These conditions seem reasonable since they help to point out the obvious 
cases of exploitation. In her article "Exploitation, Oppression and Self-sacrifice," 
Tonney claims that there are four conditions for exploitation to occur. 
Condition 1 (EC I ): Exploitation is a 3 tenn relation which requires 
a person or group of persons for at least one of the tenns. More 
specifically, the exploiter must be a person or group of persons. 
Condition 2 (EC2): Exploitation necessarily involves benefits or 
gains of some kind to someone [unlike oppression which may exist 
without anyone's gaining from it]. 
Condition 3 (EC3): Exploitation resembles a zero-sum game, viz. 
what the exploiter gains, the exploitee loses; or, minimally, for the 
exploiter to gain, the exploitee must lose. [When the environment is the 
object of exploitation, this is commonly characterized as depletion.] 
Condition 4 (EC4): When the exploitee is a person, exploitation 
requires a violation of principles of fairness consisting in either a disregard 
for the exploitee's interests or an infringement of the exploitee's rightS. I13 
Exploitation, according to Tonney, is a relation that does not necessarily happen 
only to people, since it is possible to exploit non-sentient things such as the environment, 
but that which exploits must be a person or group of persons. 114 She believes this 
condition to be mildly controversial since some acts of exploitation are unintended by the 
group that ultimately gains from the exploitative relationship and thereby seems to not 
require that the exploiter be a person. Tonney offers two reasons supporting her claim 
that the exploiter must be a person. 
The first reason that the exploiter must be a person is that "exploitation requires a 
conscious project resulting in planned benefits or gains.,,115 This is not to say that one 
must consciously set out to exploit a person or thing, but merely intend to gain from 
one's relation with the person or thing. Since exploitation may be an unintended 
consequence of one's actions, it is not necessary that a person intend to exploit something 
or someone in order to be considered an exploiter. Tonney says, "One could 
intentionally use persons or things for the sake of one's own gain (without regard for 
their interests in the case of persons) and so exploit, without it being true that one sets out 
intentionally to be an exploiter.,,116 In other words, one can be an exploiter without 
realizing that he is, in fact, exploiting something or someone. Let's use a young man by 
the name of Chad to clarify this point. (For argument's sake, let's assume that the shoe 
company Kicks exploits its Indonesian workers in order to provide the world with Kicks 
products while making an economic profit.) Chad purchases a pair of Air Kicks from a 
113 Judith Tormey, "Exploitation, Oppression, and Self-Sacrifice," Philosophical Forum 5 (1974): 207-208. 
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local sporting goods shop while unaware that Kicks exploits its third-world employees in 
order to produce Air Kicks shoes. He is not consciously supporting Kicks' unethical 
practices in Indonesia; instead all Chad really wants is to enjoy the benefits of having a 
new pair of Air Kicks. In effect, on Tormey's account, Chad is exploiting Kicks' 
Indonesian employees since he uses Kicks and its employees in order to provide the Air 
Kicks that he intends to enjoy, even though he did not intend to exploit these workers. 117 
The second reason that an exploiter must be a person is due to the close 
connection between exploitation and the conscious act of selfishness. 118 For example, 
person A acts selfishly when he ignores the interests of others involved in a situation that 
is beneficial to him even though the interests of others are morally considerable, or he 
gives their interests some consideration but fails to grant them their proper moral 
weight. 119 According to Tormey, it is incorrect to think that persons can act selfishly 
toward those beings or objects that do not have interests. 120 This point suggests that 
exploitation does not always involve selfish behavior since persons can exploit the 
natural environment, through the depletion of natural resources, even though the 
environment has not been proven to have interests. Although selfishness does not always 
accompany exploitation, Tormey acknowledges that it is often a part of exploitation. In 
those cases when exploitation involves persons, the exploitee is used as an instrument in 
a project intended to result in gains for the group or person responsible for the 
exploitation. 121 In such a case the exploitee's interests (in the case of persons) are 
ignored while she is being treated merely as a means to the exploiter's end, and thereby 
treated in a selfish manner. 
Tormey claims in EC2, "There can be no exploitation without gain.,,122 
Essentially, Tormey is suggesting that in order for the state of exploitation to obtain, the 
exploitative project must be designed to result in gains for the exploiter, and those gains 
must be realized by the exploiter. 123 She points out a fine distinction between 
exploitative and non-exploitative projects by saying, 
... exploitation characteristically implies more than casual or accidental 
gain. A person does not exploit nature if he/she goes out on a lark, pans 
for gold and happens to find some. Nature is exploited, however, if a shaft 
is sunk and a successful mine is put into operation. 124 
117 I will critique this condition in the following section of this chapter. 
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As a result, something or someone is not exploited in all cases where a person benefits or 
experiences some gain through an interaction with a thing or person, i.e. not every use is 
an instance of exploitation. For example, when a hiker fills her canteen up in a stream 
that she happened upon while hiking is not an instance of exploitation, but a farmer who 
reroutes a stream so that it flows through his pasture and waters his cattle is a case of 
exploitation.125 The main difference between the hiker and the farmer is that the hiker 
does not manipulate or change the stream in any significant way in order to gain 
refreshment, whereas the farmer significantly alters the stream to serve his intended 
126purposes. So, for exploitation to occur, one must intend to use something or someone 
as an instrument in herlhis project that necessarily results in some benefit to herlhim.127 
Another condition of exploitation, EC3, states that exploitation necessarily 
involves not only some gain for the exploiter but some corresponding loss for the 
exploitee.128 This third condition is offered to help distinguish exploitative relationships 
from relationships of mutual compensation and fair exchange, where the latter 
relationships entail that the interests of all participants have been appropriately 
considered. In EC3, Tormey suggests that exploitation resembles a zero-sum game 
resulting in the exploitee losing what the exploiter gains. But as Alan Wertheimer 
argues, not all cases of exploitation need be characterized as a "zero-sum game" since 
some cases of harmful exploitation result in the exploitee's loss being greater than the 
exploiter's gain. 129 In the case of sweatshop workers, many lose priceless things such as 
their health and even their lives while the owners/operators of the sweatshops gain 
monetarily (the former seems to be a much greater loss than the latter gain). Even though 
Tormey suggests that exploitation is a zero-sum game, she says that it merely resembles a 
zero-sum game and that, in such cases, exploitation at least results in the exploiter 
gaining from a relationship that causes the exploitee to 10se.130 Considering this latter 
interpretation of Tormey's account, Wertheimer actually agrees with Tormey as he 
claims that exploitation necessarily involves the exploiter benefiting from the 
exploitee. 131 So, exploitation requires that the exploiter's relation with the exploitee must 
result in some gain to the exploiter and some corresponding loss to the exploitee. 
What about cases of mutual exploitation, wherein each party benefits from the 
others' loss? Are these cases of fair exchange or mutual benefit? Consider a married 
125 Allen Wood uses a similar example on page 141 of his article "Exploitation." 
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couple, Norv and Leslie, for instance. 132 (In this example both Norv and Leslie fulfill 
traditional gender roles where the man is the head of the household, resulting in him 
having disproportionately more decision-making power than the housewife, Leslie. Due 
to the nature of traditional gender roles, Norv and Leslie are not starting from equal 
bargaining positions.) Norv has a demanding job as a farmer and Leslie stays home to 
take care of the house and children. When Norv comes home from work he plops 
himself in front of the TV and refuses to be bothered. Leslie on the other hand complains 
to Norv about not helping around the house enough. Norv sees himself as being 
exploited by Leslie since he has to earn a living as a farmer working long grueling hours 
for relatively little compensation. And Leslie feels that she is being exploited by Norv 
since she bears a disproportionate burden of the household chores. As a result, Norv 
exploits Leslie relative to household chores, and Leslie exploits Norv relative to not 
having to deal with the stress of earning a living for the family. The relationship between 
Norv and Leslie is one of mutual exploitation and is not the same as fair exchange since 
the latter requires that the interest of both parties be given adequate consideration from 
the beginning of their relation. 133 
Tormey offers one final condition of exploitation: "Principles of fairness are 
violated in the exploitation of persons.,,134 EC4 is needed to distinguish fair zero-sum 
games from unfair zero-sum games. Tormey uses poker, as a zero-sum game, to 
exemplify this fourth condition of exploitation. A game of poker is considered fair when 
the winners of the game gain the money that the losers lost, without deception or fraud. 
In this first case, the interests of all players are being considered, i.e. no one seeks to take 
unfair advantage of the other players, and all players freely consent to their real or 
potential losses. When playing poker with a hustler (who either cheats, by hiding cards, 
or lures his opponents into the game by misrepresenting his poker skills), this zero-sum 
game becomes unfair since the hustler ignores or discounts the interests of the other 
players in order to win, i.e. he takes unfair advantage of the other players' 
vulnerabilities. 135 In this case, the hustler is not playing by the rules of the game and he 
exploits his opponents insofar as he disregards the rules of fair play. In Tormey's words, 
"The exploiter manipulates (uses) them for his own gain and violates their right to fair 
132 The following example is similar to the one that Tormey uses in her article, "Exploitation, Oppression, 
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treatment."136 That is to say, the autonomy of the hustler's opponents is being 
disrespected since they could not rationally and freely consent to playing a game that 
would grant the hustler disproportionately more benefits relative to the other players. 
This example demonstrates that persons are exploited when their interests are ignored or 
discounted in such a way that they are treated as a mere means to some end. 
So, to pull all of Tonney's conditions together: in order for an exploitative 
relation to exist, 1) the exploiter must be a person or group of persons, 2) the relation 
must involve gains of some kind to the exploiter,137 3) the exploiter must gain from the 
exploitee's loss, and 4) when the exploitee is a person, that person's interest must be 
ignored or discounted by the exploiter so as to treat the exploitee merely as a means to 
the exploiter's end. 
Section 4.2: Fortifying Tonney's View 
At this point, Tonney seems to have constructed a reasonable account of 
exploitation, but she has failed to substantiate her implicit claim that all exploitative 
relations are morally wrong, at least when persons are the object of exploitation.138 That 
is, she does not make explicit the distinction between exploitation as referring to mere 
use (as seen in ECl -3) and exploitation as the wrongful treatment of persons (as in EC4). 
Allen Wood comments on the common pejorative usage of the tenn "exploitation" in his 
article "Exploitation." Wood claims that it has been a fault of philosophers, who explore 
the real or potential incidents of exploitation, to rely on a dictionary definition to help 
make the distinction between the non-moral and moral sense of exploitation.139 He calls 
the pejorative treatment of this tenn a "moralized" account of exploitation since these 
philosophers incorrectly understand "exploitation" to be inherently evil.140 For example, 
"exploitation" and "murder" are treated similarly in that both are understood to be 
morally wrong independent of the context in which they each occur. But this, according 
to Wood, is incorrect since "murder" is defined as "wrongful homicide" whereas 
"exploitation" is merely a variation of the word "use" and does not necessarily denote 
136 Judith Tormey, "Exploitation, Oppression, and Self-Sacrifice," Philosophical Forum 5 (1974): 213. 
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wrongful use. So, to claim that X is wrong because it is exploitative actually begs the 
question. 
Tormey's account of wrongful exploitation (i.e. exploitation of persons) appears 
to be somewhat Kantian since she appeals to Kant by saying, "That the exploitation of 
persons can be interpreted as a violation of several formulations of Kant's Categorical 
Imperative will have become evident at this point, and this helps to explain the heavily 
negative moral connotations of the concept when it applies to relations between 
persons."141 Given her usage of Kant (albeit very limited), it seems reasonable to 
interpret her account of wrongful exploitation through a Kantian lens. As a result, it 
seems that Tormey essentially believes that exploitation is wrong when persons are used 
merely as a means to the exploiter's end, i.e. when Kant's respect for persons principle is 
violated. 
Well then, what exactly does it mean to use someone as a mere means to an end? 
Ronald M. Green understands there to be at least three different interpretations of what it 
means to treat someone as a mere means. Only the third of these is relevant to the 
present discussion. 142 Green's third interpretation of Kant's "end-in-itself formula" is 
what he calls the "impartial co-legislation" interpretation. Accordingly: 
... persons are used as 'means only and not as ends,' when they are treated 
in ways they could not accept under conditions of informed, impartial, and 
rational choice as a rule of conduct for everybody (including themselves). 
It follows from this that to treat persons 'as ends in themselves' is to 
respect, not their actual willing, but their 'noumenal' or morally legislative 
impartial willing. 143 
As indicated in the above quotation, Kant's respect for persons principle essentially has 
two parts: 1) Act in such a way that you never treat humanity simply as a means; and 2) 
act in such a way that you always treat humanity as an end in itself. l44 To merely fulfill 1 
does not necessarily mean that persons will be treated in ways that respect their 
humanity. That is, 1 may be interpreted as a negative duty, non-interference, which, if 
strictly adhered to, may cultivate a disposition of indifference toward humanity in 
others. 145 To guard against indifference toward persons, we are to not only avoid treating 
141 Judith Tormey, "Exploitation, Oppression, and Self-Sacrifice," Philosophical Forum 5 (1974): 213. 
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them as mere means but also to always treat humanity as an end in itself. 146 That is, we 
should treat persons in ways that they could accept under conditions of informed, 
impartial, and rational choice as a rule of conduct for everybody, including themselves 
(let's call this acceptance under purely rational conditions). 147 
But, why do we have a moral obligation to treat persons as an ends in themselves? 
Before we can directly answer this question, we need to understand the difference 
between subjective (or relative) ends and objective ends. According to Kant, "The 
subjective ground of desire is incentive; the objective ground of volition is a motive; 
hence the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective 
ends, which depend on motives, which hold for every rational being. Practical principles 
are formal if they abstract from all subjective ends, whereas they are material if they have 
put these, and consequently certain incentives, at their basis.,,148 From Kant's perspective, 
we can see that persons set for themselves various ends which they subjectively value, 
and different persons mayor may not value one another's individual ends; these are 
considered by Kant to be relative ends since they are based on sensuous impulses. 
Relative ends, unlike objective ends, can be substituted by other ends, i.e. they have a 
price. Persons may take up or abandon particular ends depending on the utility that a 
particular end produces. After completing this thesis, I can either choose to continue on 
toward a Ph.D. in philosophy or venture out into the workforce to secure a decent paying 
job. These two ends are relative to my subjective inclinations, I can decide to choose 
which end to pursue based on the pleasure, fulfillment, or utility that I seek to gain 
these ends are instrumentally valuable. I49 However, objective ends are valuable 
regardless of the utility they produce since they are not based on inclination but reason. 
Objective ends are irreplaceable: there is no other end that is of equal value which can 
take the place of an objective end. So, relative ends, as Kant indicates, are accepted or 
rejected based on incentive whereas objective ends are valid and necessary for all rational 
agents regardless of the incentive attached to them. ISO 
The moral law is grounded in volition, and it alone (without the influence of any 
other motivating force) is able to determine the will of all rational beings, and therefore is 
a motive and not an incentive. Gi ven that the moral law is a motive, it is an objective 
end, which presents itself as valuable to every rational being, and is, thereby, intrinsically 
valuable. Persons, insofar as they are rational beings, are co-legislators of the moral law . 
Being co-legislators of the moral law, persons are the loci of the moral law. Therefore, 
Kant infers that insofar as persons are rational agents, they are objective ends which are 
to be treated as ends in themselves. 151 
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To treat persons as ends in themselves is to respect the moral law that is 
represented by their rational nature. The tenn "respect" in this situation is not always 
clearly understood. According to Kant, respect for the moral law is a feeling produced by 
an intellectual cause, and not by a "pathological" one. I52 That is, this is a feeling of the 
absence of "pathological" inclinations. Since this feeling is produced by freeing the will 
of all "pathological" inclinations, and thereby allowing the moral law to detennine the 
will, it is a moral feeling. 153 Respect for the moral law, then, is a moral feeling that 
applies to persons only, for persons are the loci of the moral law. I54 The feeling of 
admiration, which is a pleasant disposition toward a certain person (or group of people) 
either due to her accomplishments or even perceiving her as an exemplar of the moral 
law, may well be confused with the feeling of respect. I55 We can admire persons for 
perfecting their talents (as we do sports heroes) and for refining their virtuous character 
(as we do humanitarian such as Mother Teresa). However, the feeling of admiration is 
based on incentive and the feeling of respect is based on motive, and neither of these 
ways of admiring persons is equivalent to the respect we owe to them as co-legislators of 
the moral law. So, the respect that we owe to persons (as loci of the moral law) when we 
treat them as ends in themselves is not a merit based respect, but a respect that is based 
on a moral feeling (respect for the moral law ) which is binding on every rational being. 
Exploitation, then, is wrong, in my view, because it violates Kant's respect for 
persons principle: the exploiter treats the exploitee merely as a means to his end. I agree 
with Tonney in that wrongful exploitation necessarily includes ignoring or discounting 
the interests of the exploitee since the exploitee is being treat as a mere means. Similarly, 
from a Kantian perspective there are at least two reasons why treating persons selfishly 
(by ignoring or discounting their interests) is wrong: 1) The selfish agent is not properly 
respecting the moral law (represented by persons), and 2) the selfish agent prevents the 
exploitee from being able to free her will from sensuous inclinations. According to 
Tonney, acting selfishly is to ignore the interests of others or at least be indifferent to 
them. Such interests, from a Kantian perspective, cannot refer to interests in increasing 
pleasure or avoidin~ rain. Instead such interests must be, first and foremost, concerned 
with the moral law. 5 For one's will to be free, according to Kant, one must remove all 
sensuous inclinations from one's will. Moreover, the will must be self -detennined and 
not detennined b1' any sensuous impulses, for all sensuous inclinations are antagonistic to 
the moral law. I5 If, A treats B selfishly, and while being treated selfishly B's moral 
interests are frustrated by causal necessity, then A is treating B as a thing and not as a 
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person. That is, if by being treated selfishly, B is also deprived of certain necessities, she 
is prevented (or at least inhibited) from removing sensuous impulses from her will since 
all B can focus on is having her basic necessities met. Kant regards this as causing B to 
live in a state of causal necessity.I5S It is not clear which interests Tormey believes are 
morally important. While interpreting her account of exploitation from a Kantian 
perspective, we can see that the only interests deserving of our direct moral consideration 
are moral interests. Therefore, not all interests are morally relevant from a Kantian 
perspective, the only interests that we are morally compelled to consider are those that 
allow or facilitate one's ability to act morally.159 
Reconsider the case of N orv and Leslie. This case may help to clarify the sorts of 
interest that deserve direct moral consideration, from a Kantian perspective, in situations 
of wrongful exploitation. According to Tormey's conditions for exploitation, the 
relationship existing between N orv and Leslie is one of mutual exploitation and not one 
of fair exchange. 160 The latter requires that both A and B receive adequate consideration 
for their respective interests, and when both receive such treatment neither is exploited. 
However, for an exploitative relation to exist, A must treat B "unfairly.,,161 Norv, 
according to Tormey's account, is exploited by Leslie relative to working outside the 
home and Leslie is exploited by Norv relative to household chores. Neither is giving the 
other's interests proper consideration. But, it is not explicitly clear what sort of interests 
Tormey believes to be morally considerable in this situation. I suppose that, from 
Tormey's perspective, Norv should help fulfill Leslie's interests in having more 
assistance around the house, and Leslie should help to fulfill Norv's interest in having 
some help supporting the family. Yet, from a Kantian perspective, such interests are not 
necessarily moral interests and ignoring or discounting such interests does not violate 
respect for persons. So, merely having one's interests ignored or discounted while being 
treated as a means does not necessarily denote that one is being wrongfully exploited 
since the interests of both Norv and Leslie, in this case, are not necessarily moral 
interests. 
Even though the case of Norv and Leslie does not demonstrate that either is 
treating the other as a mere means to an end, it is not clear that both are treating each 
158 I realize that being deprived of some or maybe even all of one's basic necessities does not necessarily 
render one incapable of acting in accord with the moral law. However, depriving B of her basic necessities, 
A is inhibiting B's ability to act morally, and insofar as A inhibits B's ability to act morally A, himself, is 
acting immorally. 
159 I am trying to establish a moral minimum namely that these moral interests are necessary to establish a 
moral foundation for the basic rights that Shue proposes. Admittedly, there may be other morally relevant 
interests, but these would go beyond a justification for basic rights. 
160 Mutual exploitation is seemingly similar to what Alan Wertheimer calls mutually advantageous 
exploitation, which includes those exploitative relations where both the exploiter and the exploitee gain 
from the relation. It may be the case that Norv and Leslie are involved in a mutually advantageous 
exploitative relation instead of one involving mutual exploitation, where the latter suggests that the 
exploitee gains nothing from the relation. Leslie benefits from Norv's income while Norv benefits from 
Leslie's housework - this relationship is mutually advantageous. 
161 Tormey clearly states this condition in EC4, and considers "unfair" treatment to be similar to being 
treated selfishly. From a slightly different perspective, Wertheimer suggests that treating persons unfairly 
can be understood in two ways: 1) A benefits through harming B or that A's benefit far exceeds the benefit 





other as an end in themselves. Each should (categorically) treat the other in ways that 
he/she could accept under purely rational conditions.162 Presumably, neither Norv nor 
Leslie could accept being treated this way under purely rational conditions and both are 
thereby disrespecting each other. Since neither is treating the other with the sort of moral 
respect that each deserves, and each is using the other as a means to his/her end 
(exploiting), both are wrongfully exploiting one another. 
Let us consider a slightly different case: an employer-employee relationship. 
David is down on his luck and has been trying to land a decent job for quite some time. 
In order to support himself and his dependants, he must earn at least $101hr. All of the 
jobs that he has applied for have only offered, at most, $7/hr. A recruiter from the local 
coal-mining operation tells David that they are hiring and the pay is $IO/hr. including 
health benefits for him and his family. It is common knowledge that the coal-mining is 
inherently dangerous (one might develop black-lung or be trapped in the mine due to a 
collapse) even though the operation attempts to provide a safe work environment for their 
employees. After applying for the coal-mining position, David receives a job offer but is 
very reluctant to accept since he fully realizes the potential harm involved in such a job. 
Despite having other job opportunities that present far less health risks, David accepts the 
job at the coal-mining operation. Is the coal-mining operation wrongfully exploiting 
David? 
To begin with, according to Tormey, David is exploited by his new employer 
since his situation satisfies three of her conditions for exploitation. First, David's new 
employer is a person or group of persons who have developed a project (mining coal 
through the use of machines and human labor) planned to result in benefits for the firm 
(profits) (ECl -2). Second, the employer gains what David loses (labor) (EC3). So, David 
is being exploited, i.e. he is being used as a means to the firm's end. 
However, David's situation does not necessarily fulfill Tormey's fourth condition 
of exploitation, which is required to demonstrate that a case of exploitation is actually 
immoral. The offer made to David by the coal-mining operation is reasonable since the 
going rate for such a position is very close to $IO/hr., which will earn him enough money 
and health benefits to meet his basic needs and those of his family. Although David may 
feel pressured by his situation to accept the mining job (since under different conditions 
he would have refused such risky employment) the coal-mining operation is not forcing 
David to work for them, nor are they (at the outset) treating him unfairly since they made 
him a reasonable job offer, thereby adequately considering his interests. Moreover, 
David may feel exploited because he has to risk much more than he is being compensated 
for (i.e. his life), but he is not actually being wrongfully exploited since his conditions of 
employment, albeit relatively undesirable, are reasonable, i.e. the operation is giving 
David's moral interests proper consideration and he could accept such treatment under 
purely rational conditions. 
One other concern that I have with Tormey's account of exploitation is that she 
claims that exploitation requires an intentional act reSUlting in some gain for the 
exploiter. Let's return to the previous section where Tormey points out that some may 
argue that exploitation necessarily involves an intentional act to exploit on the part of the 
162 Ronald M. Green, "What Does it Mean to Use Someone as 'A Means Only': Rereading Kant," Kennedy 
Institute ofEthics Journalll, no. 3 (2001): 254. 
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exploiter since "exploitation requires a conscious project resulting in planned benefits or 
gains" for the exploiter. 163 Tormey's main point here is that wrongful exploitation must 
be a relation between at least two people where the exploiter is a person intending at 
minimum to gain from the relation. The exploiter need not intend to exploit the other 
person (or group); he must only intend to gain from the relation. Recall the above 
example concerning Chad. Chad was construed as wrongfully exploiting Kicks' 
Indonesian workers since his actions unwittingly contributed to the unfair treatment of 
these workers. According to Tormey's account of exploitation, Chad is exploiting the 
Indonesian workers when he purchases his Air Kicks. However, does it make sense to 
say that Chad is actually wrongfully exploiting these workers? Granted, Chad is 
benefiting from his conscious project to gain from his relation with Kicks' Indonesian 
workers who produce the shoes, and to this extent he satisfies Tormey's ECl -2• Chad 
merely intends to purchase and enjoy the shoes and is (let's suppose) unaware of the 
existing wrongful exploitation of the Indonesian workers. Nevertheless, Chad has no 
direct control over Kicks's treatment of its employees, and, in such a case, it seems 
unreasonable to contend that Chad is guilty of wrongfully exploiting these workers. 
Charging moral agents with exploitation in a situation that they have no direct control 
over is unreasonable, even if the moral agents benefit from the situation. 
It could be argued that Chad, as Kicks' consumer, has some control over Kicks 
through his dollar votes. But even in this case, Chad is still not in direct control over the 
workers' situation. If this is correct, it seems that even though the exploiter need not 
intend to exploit in order to exploit, the exploiter must at least be in direct control (but not 
necessarily full control) of the exploitative situation in order to be held culpable. l64 
Tormey fails to make explicitly clear the actual role one must take in the exploitative 
relation to be an exploiter, even if the exploiter does not intend to exploit. 
Even though Tormey's account of exploitation is lacking, her position appears to 
be fundamentally sound in that it successfully captures many of the necessary conditions 
which must be satisfied for an exploitative relation (both non-moral and immoral) to 
exist. By appealing to Wood and Kant to fortify Tormey's account, a robust conception 
of wrongful exploitation has been created, which is capable of addressing the immorally 
exploitative aspects of some novel interactions in the business world. In the next section 
of this chapter, I will offer my revised view of exploitation, which will incorporate my 
fortified account Tormey's view. 
163 Judith Tormey, "Exploitation, Oppression, and Self-Sacrifice," Philosophical Forum 5 (1974): 209. 
164 By "direct control", I mean having the power to influence or command the actions of individuals in a 
particular situation absent some intervening party having greater influence or command over the situation. 
The distinction being drawn between "direct control" and "full control" is that full control requires one 
person to have the sole power to influence or command a situation, whereas "direct control" may involve 







Section 4.3: My Revised View of Exploitation 
To be explicitly clear, the account of exploitation which I espouse is an empirical 
notion of exploitation. That is, I contend that not all cases of exploitation are actually 
immoral. If we take the term "exploitation" to merely be a permutation of the word 
"use," then it is not necessarily wrong that we use persons as a means to our individual 
ends. Even Kant believed that using persons as a means to an end is not prima facie 
wrong. Using persons becomes wrong when we use them merely as a means to an end. 
Accordingly, we may exploit persons for various reasons and in various ways as long as 
we treat them, at the same time, as ends in themselves. So, exploitation is wrong when 
the exploitee is treated unfairly. 
While I agree with Tormey insofar as ECl -3 denote conditions for non-moral 
exploitation and that exploitation is wrong when the exploitee is treated unfairly, I 
diverge from what she may consider "unfair" treatment. My account of wrongful 
exploitation is very Kantian since I appeal to Kant's moral philosophy to define the term 
"unfair" and thereby develop a slightly more detailed account of wrongful exploitation 
than Tormey's. 
To begin with, non-moral exploitation requires a relation to be formed between an 
exploiter and an eXfsloitee, the former must be a person whereas the latter can be either a 
person or a thing. l 5 The exploiter must be a person since persons, due to their rational 
capacity for making autonomous decisions, are capable of intentionally carrying out 
conscious projects that they set for themselves. l66 In order to be an exploiter, one must 
be in direct control (and not necessarily full control) of the exploitative relation. Even if 
one's conscious project is mainly to benefit from a situation, but does not intend to treat 
others unfairly, one must, at minimum, have some direct control over the exploitative 
relation to be accurately considered an exploiter. Put more simply, A must have some 
direct control over the treatment of B or over B's situation for A to properly be 
considered an exploiter. It seems unreasonable to think that a person can be held 
culpable for a situation that he has no direct control over. So, for one to be properly 
considered an exploiter, the exploiter must be a person and have some direct control over 
the exploitative relation. 
The exploiter (not just anyone) must be a recipient of the benefits that flow from 
an exploitative relation. That is, when A exploits B, A must benefit in some way and to 
165 It may be argued that a corporation is not a real person (moral agent) and consequently cannot fulfill this 
first condition. However, we commonly condemn or praise a corporation for its conduct and this seems 
reasonable since a corporation is controlled by a group of individuals who are, individually, appropriate 
objects of moral praise or blame. As a result, we can reasonably say that a corporation is merely a group of 
individuals. 
166 I am using the term "persons" to refer to those fully functional members of our species having the 
capacity to reflect on one's first order desires (such as sex, sleep, and hunger) at a second-order; and 
capable of acting on one's considered preferences. Denis G. Arnold and Norman E. Bowie, "Sweatshops 
and Respect for Persons," Business Ethics Quanerly 13, no. 2 (2003): 221-242. 
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some degree from his relation to B. 167 The exploiter must benefit from the exploitative 
relation since, as Tormey states above, exploitation involves a conscious project that 
results in planned gains (of some kind) for the exploiter. There appears to be no 
incentive for A to exploit B if A does not stand to benefit in some way and to some 
degree. Furthermore, even though the exploiter must benefit from the exploitive relation, 
he need not be the only recipient of the benefits nor the party that benefits the most 
(primary recipient). Let's reconsider the Kicks case above. Kicks employ an Indonesian 
contractor to produce a certain line of products. Due to the terms of the labor agreement, 
Kicks has no direct control over the treatment of the contractor's employees. The 
Indonesian contractor wrongfully exploits its employees by requiring them to work under 
hazardous conditions (treating them merely as tools). In this situation, Kicks is not the 
exploiter since it does not have direct control over the contractor's workers. Both Kicks 
and the contractor benefit from the exploitation of the workers, but the contractor's gain 
is less than that of Kicks'. Kicks' profits are greater than the contractor's payments, 
making Kicks the primary recipient of the benefits flowing from the exploitative relation. 
This example illustrates a case when the exploiter is not the primary recipient of the 
exploitative relation, but does receive some benefit in the form of payment. The main 
point here is that A need only be in direct control over his relation with B to be correctly 
construed as B' s exploiter even though A is not the primary recipient of the benefits 
flowing from the exploitative relation between A and B. 
In order for exploitation to be morally wrong, individuals must be treated unfairly. 
I understand "unfair" treatment to mean illegitimately capitalizing on persons' 
vulnerabilities, which is to benefit from treating them merely as a means to and end. 168 In 
fair game situations a competitor is celebrated if he is able to capitalize on his opponent's 
vulnerabilities as long as he plays by the rules of the game. In such a situation the 
competitors in the game consent to the risk of being left worse-off (losing the game). If 
A exploits B's vulnerabilities through fraudulent or deceptive means, A can be said to 
have inappropriately capitalized on B's vulnerabilities. In such a fraudulent situation, B 
has either not consented to being left worse-off or has been forced by her situation to 
accept being left worse-off. Reaping the benefits of a situation through fraudulent or 
deceptive means is equivalent to lying or cheating. Both of these are wrong from a 
Kantian perspective since both treat people as mere tools. Treating persons in such a way 
is equivalent to disregard their moral interests, which is to force them to live a life of 
causal necessity. If persons are compelled to live through causal necessity, they are 
inhibited or prevented from freeing their individual wills from sensuous inclinations. 
Those who are responsible (either fully or partially) for constraining persons to causal 
necessity are disrespecting them as moral agents capable of autonomous rational action. 
So, from a Kantian perspective, treating B as a mere means to an end is to deny or ignore 
B's ability to make rational decisions (i.e. to deny her dignity). So, B is treated unfairly 
. 
167 Claiming that the exploiter must benefit "in some way" and "to some degree" may seem redundant, but 
there is a subtle difference between the two provisos. One can benefit from a situation by gaining money, 
respect, pleasure, etc. One can also benefit in the same ways, but to differing degrees: gaining more or less 
money, respect, pleasure, etc. 
168 To inappropriately capitalize on B's vulnerabilities is to render B worse-off. Being left worse-off 
involves being deprived of something that one is entitled to, which may entail having something taken 









to the extent that her dignity is ignored or discounted, and such unfair treatment evolves 
into a wrongfully exploitative relation when the person in direct control of the situation 
illegitimately capitalizes on B's vulnerabilities while treating her as a mere means. 
In summary, exploitation is not always immoral. For a particular relation to be 
considered wrongfully exploitative, it must first meet the non-moral conditions of 
exploitation. If a situation reveals that persons are merely treated unfairly (i.e. treated as 
mere means), while the remainder of the situation does not meet the requirements for an 
exploitative relation, then it may be wrong on some other account but it would not be a 
case of wrongful exploitation. That is, just to violate Kant's respect for persons principle 
does not, in itself, make the relation wrongfully exploitative. A particular situation is 
wrongfully exploitative when it first meets all requirements of an exploitative relation and 
also results in A treating B (who must be a person) as a mere means to his end or A 
failing to respect B's dignity and thereby leaving B worse-off. So, wrongful exploitation 
need not only involve A treating B as a mere means to A's premeditated end, but it also 
involves cases when A is using B as a means to his end and fails to, at the same time, 
treat B as an end in herself. 
At this point I have constructed a view of exploitation that is primarily based on 
Judith Tormey's account of exploitation as detailed in her article "Exploitation, 
Oppression, and Self-Sacrifice." Although my revised view is very similar to Tormey's, 
I have used the work of Allen Wood and Immanuel Kant to help fortify the weak points 
in Tormey's position. Additionally, I have offered a few of my own solutions to 
Tormey's weaknesses to develop a robust analysis of exploitation, which (I hope) can be 
used to detect not only clear cases of exploitation but also its most subtle forms. To test 
my analysis, I will apply my revised view of exploitation to the contemporary debate 
concerning the implementation of genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs), more 
popularly known as Terminator Technology. 
Section 4.4: Exploitation and Terminator Technology 
The crux of the activist groups' main argument opposing the implementation of 
Terminator Technology is that it will fringe upon the basic rights of resource-poor 
farmers allowing MACs to take unfair advantage of them by inappropriately capitalizing 
on their vulnerabilities. As I argued in Chapter 3, the potential implementation of 
Terminator Technology will not necessarily infringe upon the basic rights of resource­
poor farmers. However, even if the implementation of Terminator Technology does not 
infringe upon the basic rights of resource-poor farmers, will the potential implementation 
of this technology by MACs wrongfully exploit resource-poor farmers? In an attempt to 
answer this question, we need to determine two things: First, will MACs be engaged in a 
non-moral exploitative relation with resource-poor farmers if Terminator Technology is 
actually implemented? Second, will MACs be taking unfair advantage of farmers 
through the implementation of Terminator Technology by illegitimately capitalizing on 
the farmers' vulnerabilities? 
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For MACs to be accurately construed as exploiters of resource-poor fanners (in 
the non-moral sense), they must be engaged in the following actions. 
• 	 The exploiter must be a person or group of persons. 
• 	 The exploiter must have some direct control over the exploitative relation. 
• 	 The exploiter must benefit in some way and to some degree from his 
relation to the exploitee. 
Additionally, to be accurately construed as wrongfully exploiting resource-poor fanners, 
MACs must meet the above three requirements and, at the same time, fail to adequately 
respect the individual fanners' dignity. 
Recall from the human rights discussion in Chapter 3 that there are actually two 
distinct seed supply sectors throughout most of the world: the formal seed sector and the 
informal seed sector. The formal sector predominantly supplies seed to commercial 
fanners engaged in high-intensity farming and only partially supplies medium-intensity 
fanners. The informal seed sector is responsible for supplying most of the seed needs of 
medium-intensity fanners and all of the seed needs of low-intensity fanners (both sorts of 
fanners are considered to be resource-poor due to their inability to afford to engage in 
high-intensity farming). Although these two sectors currently exchange genetic 
information, the formal seed sector perceives such exchanges to be leaks instead of free 
exchanges since most breeders in this sector seek remuneration for the use of their seeds, 
whereas the informal breeders are content with the free exchange of genetic information. 
Furthermore, only those plant varieties that are currently genetically modified will be the 
targets for the implementation of Terminator Technology, and only those farmers who 
obtain seed from the formal sector will be affected by such implementation. Given that 
most resource-poor fanners are currently unable to afford genetically modified varieties, 
and the primary targets for implementing Terminator Technology are currently modified 
varieties, MACs will not have the opportunity to form a relation with these fanners so as 
to use them as a means to maximizing profits. Consequently, we can see that the 
Terminator Technology debate (as presented by many activist groups) fails to satisfy an 
essential condition of wrongful exploitation. 
However, Christian Aid contends that MACs may potentially take unfair 
advantage of resource-poor fanners through the use of aggressive marketing schemes that 
are currentl y being used to dupe uneducated fanners into using GM plant varieties. 
These aggressive tactics include free seed trials, misleading promotions, and credits. 
Such marketing techniques are, according to Christian Aid, essentially an attempt to 
wrongfully exploit uneducated fanners who are incapable of accurately discernin~ 
between unsubstantiated claims and scientific facts regarding the products being sold. 1 
There have been no clear cases detailing practices that involve aggressive marketing 
schemes to dupe resource-poor fanners into purchasing suicide seeds, and without a 
detailed case, we cannot accurately determine if MACs are actually wrongfully exploiting 
resource-poor fanners in this way. As a result, the only way that MACs can accurately 
be said to be wrongfully exploiting resource-poor fanners by selling terminator seeds is if 
169 Christian Aid, "Selling Suicide: Farming, False Promises and Genetic Engineering in Developed 




these corporations actually engage in deceptive or aggressive marketing schemes 
designed to entice these farmers to begin using OM varieties that contain the terminator 
gene. So, as long as MACs refrain from using such immoral marketing techniques, these 
corporations cannot be said to be wrongfully exploiting resource-poor farmers. 
But what about Terminator Technology becoming so pervasive that resource-poor 
farmers unwillingly become exposed to "suicide seeds" through seeds leaking into the 
informal seed sector? That is, can MACs be accurately construed as wrongfully 
exploiting resource-poor farmers if these farmers unknowingly sow "suicide seeds" 
thereby being left with sterile seeds for planting subsequent years' crops? Admittedly, 
such a situation would leave unwitting farmers worse off, but the MACs distributing the 
"suicide seeds" would not necessarily benefit from such a situation since these farmers 
would not have the economic resources available to purchase seed from these 
corporations in subsequent years, and would therefore not be wrongfully exploiting these 
farmers. Alternatively, these farmers would have to initially seek assistance from their 
home government or attempt to replenish their seed stores by obtaining seeds from the 
informal seed sector. However, it is reasonable to hold MACs responsible for controlling 
the safe distribution of the terminator seeds so that peripheral negative socioeconomic 
impacts are minimized. To guard against seeds leaking into the informal seed sector 
MACs distributing terminator seeds should educate their national distributors and sales 
personnel so as to only sell these seeds to commercial farmers. In addition to educating 
their own personnel, MACs may have the responsibility of establishing or helping to 
establish a public seed breeding initiative that would help minimize the income gap 
between resource-poor farmers and commercial farmers that may occur due to the 
implementation of Terminator Technology. So, the implementation of Terminator 






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
At this point, I have only addressed a very limited range of concerns relative to 
the broader scope of socioeconomic and environmental issues that are either directly 
associated (or tangentially associated) with this issue. Even though such issues are all 
very important and require careful attention, I have limited my discussion to dealing only 
with those few but powerful criticisms leveled against the potential implementation of 
Terminator Technology by NGOs and activist groups. 
In light of the barrage of criticisms that Terminator Technology has received since 
it was first proposed as a potential addition to GM technology, the main arguments 
leveled against this technology appear to be misinformed due to the inaccuracy of their 
empirical claims. After taking a closer look at the critics' arguments opposing Terminator 
Technology we can see that the potential implementation of this technology will not 
necessarily infringe upon the basic rights of resource-poor farmers, neither will it 
inevitably wrongfully exploit them in an attempt to maximize seed industry profits. As I 
argued in Chapter 3, farmers do not actually have a right to save GM seeds without the 
expressed permission of the corporations that produced the seeds. Such corporations 
have the right to control the use of their intellectual property. Additionally, in Chapter 4, 
I argued that as long as MACs avoid using deceptive marketing schemes to entice 
farmers into using GM plant varieties containing terminator genes, MACs cannot be 
accurately construed as wrongfully exploiting resource-poor farmers since these 
corporations will not be dealing directly with these farmers and will not have the 
opportunity to use them as a means to maximizing seed industry profits. 
In conclusion, even though I contend that MACs will not be infringing upon 
resource-poor farmers' rights nor wrongfully exploiting them through the potential 
implementation of Terminator Technology, I do think that MACs have a minimal social 
responsibility to help educate farmers so that they can accurately assess the risks and 
benefits involved in using GM seeds, especially those containing the terminator gene. 
This may require that MACs participate in the investment of public seed breeding 
initiatives, and possibly help resource-poor farmers to understand their alternatives to 
farming systems that require a significant amount of purchased inputs such as organic 
farming. Although MACs would not be wrongfully exploiting resource-poor farmers, 
they would still have a moral responsibility to respect (in a Kantian manner) the farmers 
who are potentially negatively affected by the implementation so as to not be culpable for 
making resource-poor farmers lead lives of causal necessity. Most importantly, MACs 
have a responsibility to mitigate any and all negative effects of their actions especially the 
implementation of novel technologies. 
So, although I believe that advances in GM technology may prove to be beneficial 
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